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Constitutional Politics in Europe: Governing with Judges elaborates a theory of constitutional politics, the process through which the discursive practices and techniques of constitutional adjudication come to structure the work of governments, parliaments, judges, and administrators. Focusing on the cases of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the European Union, the book examines the sources and consequences of the pan-European movement to confer constitutional review authority on a new governmental institution, the constitutional court. Detailed case studies illustrate how and to what extent legislative processes have been placed under the influence of constitutional judges. In a growing number of policy domains, these judges function as powerful, adjunct legislators. As constitutional courts have consolidated their position as authoritative interpreters of the constitutional law, and especially of human rights provisions, the work of the judiciary, too, has gradually been constitutionalised. Today, ordinary judges seek to detect violations of the constitution in their application of the various codes, and to rewrite statutes that they deem unconstitutional. Constitutional politics have not only provoked the demise of traditional notions of parliamentary sovereignty, they have organized profound transformations in the very nature of European governance. Stone Sweet argues that constitutional adjudication constructs complex causal linkages between rule systems and normativity, on the one hand, and the strategic behaviour of individuals, on the other. The theory constitutes a novel synthesis of normative and rational approaches to politics. The book also addresses central questions raised by a wide range of ongoing theory projects, including the 'new institutionalism,'rational choice, principal-agent theories of delegation, and the new constitutionalism in Continental legal theory.

Tabla de contenidos provista por Syndetics

• 1 Governing with Judges
• 2 Constitutional Adjudication and Parliamentary Democracy
• 3 Legislating
• 4 Protecting Rights
• 5 The Politics of Judging
• 6 Constructing a Supranational Constitution
• 7 Theory of Constitutional Politics

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CHOICE Review

Sweet presents a theory of constitutional politics as the conduit through which governance in Europe is being transformed. Sweet's dual mission is to address the evolving role of constitutional court judges in consolidating their positions as authoritative interpreters of constitutional law in Europe and to present a theory of "constitutional adjudication" with complex linkages among rule systems, norms, and strategic behavior of individuals. This novel synthesis of normative and rational approaches in the European context is applied to cases in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the EU. Sweet focuses on sources and consequences of the construction of judicial power that are "symptomatic of a profound generic social process." Through case studies, Sweet illustrates how and to what extent legislative processes have been subverted by constitutional court judges, who in significant policy domains function as "proxy" legislators. Third-party dispute resolution and rule making, he notes, constitute an often privileged mechanism of adapting rule systems to the needs and purposes of those who live under them. The summary illustrates how and why dispute resolution and judicial rule making are often basic to "politics-within-institutions," and more generally to the process of political change. The volume achieves its dual mission, concluding that gains made by judges in "constitutional adjudication" are responsible for eroding the traditional notions of parliamentary supremacy/sovereignty in Europe and by extension are changing the nature of European governance. Recommended for upper-division undergraduates and graduates in comparative judicial politics. M. G. Pufong Valdosta State University

Notas de autor provistas por Syndetics

Alec Stone Sweet is Official Fellow in Politics, Chair in Comparative Government, Nuffield College, Oxford University.