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Latin American democracies of the sixties and seventies, most theories hold, collapsed because they had become incompatible with the structural requirements of capitalist development. In this groundbreaking application of game theory to political phenomena, Youssef Cohen argues that structural conditions in Latin American countries did not necessarily preclude the implementation of social and economic reforms within a democratic framework.

Focusing on the experiences of Chile and Brazil, Cohen argues that what thwarted democratic reforms in Latin America was a classic case of prisoner's dilemma. Moderates on the left and the right knew the benefits of coming to a mutual agreement on socio-economic reforms. Yet each feared that, if it cooperated, the other side could gain by colluding with the radicals. Unwilling to take this risk, moderate groups in both countries splintered and joined the extremists. The resulting disorder opened the way for military control.

Cohen further argues that, in general, structural explanations of political phenomena are inherently flawed; they incorrectly assume that beliefs, preferences, and actions are caused by social, political, and economic structures. One cannot explain political outcomes, Cohen argues, without treating beliefs and preferences as partly independent from structures, and as having a causal force in their own right.

Tabla de contenidos provista por Syndetics

• List of Figures
• Acknowledgments
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Structural Explanation
• 3 Structural Explanations of Democratic Breakdown
• 4 Rational-Choice Explanation
• 5 The Prisoner's Dilemma and the Collapse of Democracy
• 6 Breakdown before Reforms: Brazil
• 7 Reforms before Breakdown: Chile
• 8 Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index

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CHOICE Review

Cohen takes issue with the common understanding that the repression of reforms and democracy and the emergence of military regimes in Latin America during the decades of the 60s and 70s were attributable to attendant structural problems of capitalist development. Instead he favors "an intentional rational-choice explanation" of the breakdown of democracies. He argues that deep socioeconomic and political reforms were not necessarily undermined by structural conditions and that a majority of political elites favored substantial reforms prior to military intervention in Brazil during 1964 and in Chile during 1973. His book offers a critique of structural explanations of democratic breakdowns and elaborates on the rational-choice explanations; then goes on to present a game theory understanding of the collapse of democracy; and concludes by applying his approach to the Chilean and Brazilian cases. The fundamental thesis suggests that economic, state, and class structures do not explain the behavior of actors or the outcomes of their interaction; instead, their goals, preferences, and beliefs become determinate. These outcomes depend, the author insists, on the gradual implementation of serious reform by political elites committed to preserving democracy. The book succeeds in linking its theoretical framework to empirical case studies and in applying a rational-choice approach to political inquiry, a major thrust in contemporary political science. Graduate; faculty.