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What causes war? How can military conflicts best be prevented? In this book, Stephen Van Evera frames five conditions that increase the risk of interstate war: false optimism about the likely outcome of a war, a first-strike advantage, fluctuation in the relative power of states, circumstances that allow nations to parlay one conquest into another, and circumstances that make conquest easy.

According to Van Evera, all but one of these conditions--false optimism--rarely occur today, but policymakers often erroneously believe in their existence. He argues that these misperceptions are responsible for many modern wars, and explores both World Wars, the Korean War, and the 1967 Mideast War as test cases. Finally, he assesses the possibility of nuclear war by applying all five hypotheses to its potential onset. Van Evera's book demonstrates that ideas from the Realist paradigm can offer strong explanations for international conflict and valuable prescriptions for its control.

Tabla de contenidos provista por Syndetics

• Tables and Diagrams(p. vii)
• Acknowledgments(p. viii)
• 1. Introduction(p. 1)
• Questions Addressed, Why They Arise(p. 1)
• Arguments Advanced, Answers Offered(p. 4)
• Implications for Realism(p. 7)
• Methods(p. 11)
• Plan of the Book(p. 13)
• 2. False Optimism: Illusions of the Coming War(p. 14)
• False Hope and War(p. 14)
• Illusions of Victory(p. 16)
• Illusions of Cheap War(p. 30)
• To Prevent War, Promote Transparency(p. 34)
• 3. Jumping the Gun: First-Move Advantages and Crisis Instability(p. 35)
• First-Strike, First-Mobilization, and First-Move Advantages(p. 37)
• Hypotheses on the Effects of First-Move Advantages(p. 39)
• Tests of Stability Theory(p. 53)
• Causes of and Cures for First-Move Advantage(p. 69)
• 4. Power Shifts: Windows of Opportunity and Vulnerability(p. 73)
• Types of Windows(p. 74)
• Hypotheses on the Effects of Windows(p. 75)
• Tests of Window Theory(p. 87)
• Causes and Cures of Windows(p. 103)
• 5. Cumulative Resources(p. 105)
• What Is Cumulativity?(p. 105)
• Cumulativity and Conflict(p. 108)
• Types of Cumulativity(p. 110)
• Beliefs about Cumulativity and Their Implications(p. 112)
• The Future of Cumulativity(p. 114)
• 6. Offense, Defense, and the Security Dilemma(p. 117)
• Hypotheses on the Effects of Offense Dominance(p. 123)
• Qualifications: When Offensive Doctrines and Capabilities Cause Peace(p. 152)
• Causes of Offense and Defense Dominance(p. 160)
• Predictions and Tests of Offense-Defense Theory(p. 166)
• How Much History Can Offense-Defense Theory Explain?(p. 185)
• Offense-Defense Theory in Perspective(p. 190)
• 7. Offense-Defense Theory and the Outbreak of World War I(p. 193)
• The Rise of the Cult of the Offensive, 1890-1914(p. 194)
• Predictions of Offense-Defense Theory about Europe, 1890-1914(p. 199)
• Evidence on Offense-Defense Theory, 1890-1914(p. 202)
• Offense-Defense Theory and the Test of 1914(p. 233)
• Explaining World War I(p. 236)
• 8. The Nuclear Revolution and the Causes of War(p. 240)
• MAD among Deterrable States(p. 243)
• MAD among Nondeterrable States; MAD among Many States(p. 247)
• Alternatives to MAD: MARNE, BAD, WORSE, and USA(p. 250)
• The Janus-Faced Revolution(p. 253)
• 9. Conclusion(p. 255)
• Appendix Hypotheses on Power and the Causes of War(p. 259)
• Index(p. 263)

Notas de autor provistas por Syndetics

Stephen Van Evera is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a member of the MIT Security Studies Program. He is the author of Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, also from Cornell.