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The Law of the Sea (LOS) treaty resulted from some of the most complicated multilateral negotiations ever conducted. Difficult bargaining produced a remarkably sophisticated agreement on the financial aspects of deep ocean mining and on the financing of a new international mining entity. This book analyzes those negotiations along with the abrupt U.S. rejection of their results. Building from this episode, it derives important and subtle general rules and propositions for reaching superior, sustainable agreements in complex bargaining situations.

James Sebenius shows how agreements were possible among the parties because and not in spite of differences in their values, expectations, and attitudes toward time and risk. He shows how linking separately intractable issues can generate a zone of possible agreement. He analyzes the extensive role of a computer model in the LOS talks. Finally, he argues that in many negotiations neither the issues nor the parties are fixed and develops analytic techniques that predict how the addition or deletion of either issues or parties may affect the process of reaching agreement.

Tabla de contenidos provista por Syndetics

• Introduction
• Part 1 Agreement in the Small, Disagreement in the Large: Financial Arrangements and the Law of the Sea Conference
• I Background: Of Nodules, Navies, and Negotiation
• 1 Setting the Stage
• 2 Whence the Law of the Sea Conference?
• 3 Conference Organization and Procedures
• 4 Financial Arrangements in the Seabed Regime of the LOS Treaty
• 5 Summary
• II Course of the Financial Negotiations
• 6 Themes in the Chronology
• 7 The 1977 New York Session
• 8 The 1978 Geneva Session
• 9 The 1978 New York Session
• 10 The 1979 Geneva Session
• 11 The 1979 New York Session and Beyond
• 12 Appendix 1: The Detailed Financial Arrangements Proposals
• 13 Appendix 2: Description of the MIT Model
• III Elements of Agreement
• 14 Diverse Factors in Agreement
• 15 Use of an Outside Model
• 16 Agreement as the Result of Differences
• 17 Combining Issues
• 18 Summary
• IV Disagreement in the Large: Explanation and Evaluation
• 19 A Framework for Negotiation Analysis
• 20 Evolution of the U.S. Negotiating Strategy
• 21 The Shape of the Final LOS Treaty
• 22 The Central Trade: Navigation and Nodules
• 23 What Happened? Explaining the Reagan Decision
• 24 Evaluating the Decision to Reject the Treaty
• 25 Summary and Conclusions
• Part 2 Agreement in Negotiation: General Propostitons
• V Differences and Joint Gains
• 26 Beyond Common Ground for Negotiation
• 27 Elements of a Differences Orientation
• 28 More Formal Difference Analysis
• VI Negotiation Arithmetic: Adding and Subtracting Issues and Parties
• 29 A Common Point of Departure
• 30 Adding and Subtracting Issues
• 31 Adding and Subtracting Parties
• 32 Summary and Conclusions
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index

Notas de autor provistas por Syndetics

James K. Sebenius is Assistant Professor of Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.