Private property and the limits of American constitutionalism the Madisonian framework and its legacy Jennifer Nedelsky.
Detalles de publicación: Chicago University of Chicago Press c1990.Descripción: xiii, 343 p. 24 cmISBN:- 0226569705 (alk. paper)
- KF562 .N43 1990
| Imagen de cubierta | Tipo de ítem | Biblioteca actual | Biblioteca de origen | Colección | Ubicación en estantería | Signatura topográfica | Materiales especificados | Info Vol | URL | Copia número | Estado | Notas | Fecha de vencimiento | Código de barras | Reserva de ítems | Prioridad de la cola de reserva de ejemplar | Reservas para cursos | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Libro | Biblioteca de Derecho Mons. Fremiot Torres Oliver Colección General biblioteca derecho | KF 562 .N43 1990 (Navegar estantería(Abre debajo)) | Disponible | 70000000387956 |
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Descripciones mejoradas de Syndetics:
The United States Constitution was designed to secure the rights of individuals and minorities from the tyranny of the majority--or was it? Jennifer Nedelsky's provocative study places this claim in an utterly new light, tracing its origins to the Framers' preoccupation with the protection of private property. She argues that this formative focus on property has shaped our institutions, our political system, and our very understanding of limited government.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Tabla de contenidos provista por Syndetics
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- I Private Property and American Constitutional Government
- II The American Conception of Limited Government
- III The Lessons of the Formation
- IV The Focus on the Framers: Madison, Morris, and Wilson
- V The Structure
- 2 The Madisonian Vision: The Republican Solution to the Republican Problem
- I The Dilemma of Republican Government
- II The Republican Solution to Republican Problems
- III Conclusion
- 3 Aristocratic Capitalism: The Federalist Alternative of Gouverneur Morris
- I The Priority of Property in the Market Republic
- II Divisions in Society: The Poor versus the Rich
- III The Institutions of Government
- IV Political Liberty in a Commercial Republic
- V Property as Boundary
- VI The Clarity of Singlemindedness
- 4 The Democratic Federalist Alternative: James Wilson and the Potential of Participation
- I Philosophical Foundations
- II The Objects of Government
- III The Principles of Government
- IV The Institutions of Government
- V Democratic Injustice and Democratic Participation
- 5 The Madisonian Constitution
- I Class, Power, and the Hierarchy of Rights
- II The Neglect of Self-Governance
- III The Limitations Confirmed: The Anti-Federalist Perspective
- IV The Madisonian Constitution: Republican or Liberal?
- V The Conceptual Framework
- VI Judicial Review: The Consolidation and Transformation of the Madisonian Framework
- VII Afterword
- 6 The Legacy of the Formation and the Limits of American Constitutionalism
- I The Madisonian Conceptual Legacy: Private Property, Inequality, and the Distortion of the Republican Problem
- II The Failure of Public Liberty
- III Economic and Political Power
- IV The Puzzle of Property
- V The Disintegration of Property as Limit
- VI Reform through Redefinition
- VII The Mythic Power of Property
- VIII The Egalitarian Challenge
- IX Foundations of Constitutionalism Works Frequently Cited
- Notes
- Index