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Private property and the limits of American constitutionalism the Madisonian framework and its legacy Jennifer Nedelsky.

Por: Detalles de publicación: Chicago University of Chicago Press c1990.Descripción: xiii, 343 p. 24 cmISBN:
  • 0226569705 (alk. paper)
Tema(s): Clasificación LoC:
  • KF562 .N43 1990
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Libro Biblioteca de Derecho Mons. Fremiot Torres Oliver Colección General biblioteca derecho KF 562 .N43 1990 (Navegar estantería(Abre debajo)) Disponible 70000000387956
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Descripciones mejoradas de Syndetics:

The United States Constitution was designed to secure the rights of individuals and minorities from the tyranny of the majority--or was it? Jennifer Nedelsky's provocative study places this claim in an utterly new light, tracing its origins to the Framers' preoccupation with the protection of private property. She argues that this formative focus on property has shaped our institutions, our political system, and our very understanding of limited government.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Tabla de contenidos provista por Syndetics

  • Acknowledgments
  • 1 Introduction
  • I Private Property and American Constitutional Government
  • II The American Conception of Limited Government
  • III The Lessons of the Formation
  • IV The Focus on the Framers: Madison, Morris, and Wilson
  • V The Structure
  • 2 The Madisonian Vision: The Republican Solution to the Republican Problem
  • I The Dilemma of Republican Government
  • II The Republican Solution to Republican Problems
  • III Conclusion
  • 3 Aristocratic Capitalism: The Federalist Alternative of Gouverneur Morris
  • I The Priority of Property in the Market Republic
  • II Divisions in Society: The Poor versus the Rich
  • III The Institutions of Government
  • IV Political Liberty in a Commercial Republic
  • V Property as Boundary
  • VI The Clarity of Singlemindedness
  • 4 The Democratic Federalist Alternative: James Wilson and the Potential of Participation
  • I Philosophical Foundations
  • II The Objects of Government
  • III The Principles of Government
  • IV The Institutions of Government
  • V Democratic Injustice and Democratic Participation
  • 5 The Madisonian Constitution
  • I Class, Power, and the Hierarchy of Rights
  • II The Neglect of Self-Governance
  • III The Limitations Confirmed: The Anti-Federalist Perspective
  • IV The Madisonian Constitution: Republican or Liberal?
  • V The Conceptual Framework
  • VI Judicial Review: The Consolidation and Transformation of the Madisonian Framework
  • VII Afterword
  • 6 The Legacy of the Formation and the Limits of American Constitutionalism
  • I The Madisonian Conceptual Legacy: Private Property, Inequality, and the Distortion of the Republican Problem
  • II The Failure of Public Liberty
  • III Economic and Political Power
  • IV The Puzzle of Property
  • V The Disintegration of Property as Limit
  • VI Reform through Redefinition
  • VII The Mythic Power of Property
  • VIII The Egalitarian Challenge
  • IX Foundations of Constitutionalism Works Frequently Cited
  • Notes
  • Index

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CHOICE Review

The cost of securing property rights in the US has been a tradition of underdeveloped democracy and political favoritism for economic power. This not unfamiliar observation forms the thesis of Nedelsky's brilliant exploration of the place of property in US constitutionalism. Nedelsky carefully demonstrates how the popular threat to property was for James Madison the model instance of tension between democracy and individual rights. She makes the case in highly original fashion, carefully contrasting Madison's theory with the "aristocratic capitalism" of Governeur Morris and the "democratic federalism" of James Wilson. Failing to heed the objections of Morris and Wilson, the constitutional convention produced a " shallow conception of democracy" that neither fosters political participation by the many (as Wilson wanted) nor faces up to the oligarchical implications of rule by the rich (which Morris feared). Nedelsky concludes her work by exploring the demise of property as a legal limit to governmental power and considers what kind of constitutional theory would be necessary to replace property as the model of security and liberty. Although she merely sketches the agenda for a nonproperty-based constitutionalism, her analysis of the Madisonian roots of current dilemmas marks this as an outstanding work of political-legal scholarship. Highly recommended. Upper-division undergraduates and above. -S. Plotkin, Vassar College

Notas de autor provistas por Syndetics

Jennifer Nedelsky is associate professor of law and political science at the University of Toronto.
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