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Known for its consistent emphasis on decision-making, Samuelson & Mark's 6th edition provides a detailed introduction to managerial economics for undergraduates, MBAs, and executives alike. Each chapter opens with a description of a managerial problem that challenges the reader and concludes by revisiting and analyzing the decision.

In addition to its inclusion of real-world applications and problems, The 6th Edition has been revised to incorporate up-to-date coverage of international topics and e-commerce. This new edition offers the framework and economics tools necessary to prepare students for better decision-making in a future managerial role. 

Tabla de contenidos provista por Syndetics

• Chapter 1 Introduction to Economic Decision Making
• Seven Examples Of Managerial Decisions
• Six Steps To Decision Making
• Step 1 Define the Problem
• Step 2 Determine the Objective
• Step 3 Explore the Alternatives
• Step 4 Predict the Consequences
• Step 5 Make a Choice
• Step 6 Perform Sensitivity Analysis
• Private And Public Decisions: An Economic View
• Things To Come
• The Aim of This Book
• Section I Decisions Within Firms
• Chapter 2 Optimal Decisions Using Marginal Analysis
• Siting a Shopping Mall
• A Simple Model Of The Firm
• A Microchip Manufacturer
• Marginal Analysis
• Marginal Analysis and Calculus
• Marginal Revenue And Marginal Cost
• Marginal Revenue
• Marginal Cost
• Profit Maximization Revisited
• Sensitivity Analysis
• Asking What if
• Appendix To Chapter 2: Calculus And Optimization Techniques
• Special Appendix To Chapter 2: Optimization Using Spreadsheets
• Chapter 3 Demand Analysis And Optimal Pricing
• Determinants Of Demand
• The Demand Function
• The Demand Curve and Shifting Demand
• General Determinants of Demand
• Elasticity Of Demand
• Price Elasticity
• Other Elasticities
• Price Elasticity and Prediction
• Demand Analysis And Optimal Pricing
• Price Elasticity, Revenue, and Marginal Revenue
• Maximizing Revenue
• Optimal Markup Pricing
• Price Discrimination
• Information Goods
• Appendix To Chapter 3: Consumer Preferences And Demand
• Chapter 4 Estimating and Forecasting Demand
• Collecting Data
• Consumer Surveys
• Controlled Market Studies
• Uncontrolled Market Data
• Regression Analysis
• Ordinary Least-Squares Regression
• Interpreting Regression Statistics
• Potential Problems in Regression
• Choosing a Regression Equation
• Forecasting
• Time-Series Models
• Fitting a Simple Trend
• Barometric Models
• Forecasting Performance
• Final Thoughts
• Appendix To Chapter 4: Regression Using Spreadsheets
• Special Appendix To Chapter 4: Statistical Tables
• Chapter 5 Production
• Basic Production Concepts
• Production Technology
• Production With One Variable Input
• Short-Run and Long-Run Production
• Optimal Use of an Input
• Production In The Long Run
• Returns to Scale
• Least-Cost Production
• Measuring Production Functions
• Linear Production
• Production with Fixed Proportions
• Polynomial Functions
• The Cobb-Douglas Function
• Estimating Production Functions
• Other Production Decisions
• Multiple Plants
• Multiple Products
• Chapter 6 Cost Analysis
• Relevant Costs
• Opportunity Costs and Economic Profits
• Fixed and Sunk Costs
• Profit Maximization with Limited Capacity: Ordering a Best Seller
• The Cost Of Production
• Short-Run Costs
• Long-Run Costs
• Returns To Scale And Scope
• Returns to Scale
• Economies of Scope
• Cost Analysis And Optimal Decisions
• A Single Product
• The Shut-Down Rule
• Multiple Products
• Appendix To Chapter 6: Transfer Pricing
• Special Appendix To Chapter 6: Short-Run And Long-Run Costs
• Section II Competing Within Markets
• Chapter 7 Perfect Competition
• The Basics Of Supply And Demand
• Competitive Equilibrium
• Decisions of the Competitive Firm
• Market Equilibrium
• Market Efficiency
• Private Markets: Benefits and Costs
• International Trade
• Chapter 8 Monopoly
• Pure Monopoly
• Barriers to Entry
• Perfect Competition Versus Pure Monopoly
• Cartels
• Natural Monopolies
• Monopolistic Competition
• Chapter 9 Oligopoly
• Oligopoly
• Industry Concentration
• Concentration And Prices
• Quantity Competition
• A Dominant Firm
• Competition Among Symmetric Firms
• Price Competition
• Price Rigidity And Kinked Demand
• Price Wars And The Prisoner's Dilemma
• Other Dimensions Of Competition
• Advertising
• Strategic Commitments
• Appendix To Chapter 9: Tying And Bundling
• Chapter 10 Game Theory And Competitive Strategy
• Sizing Up Competitive Situations
• Analyzing Payoff Tables
• Equilibrium Strategies
• Competitive Strategy
• Market Entry
• Bargaining
• Sequential Competition
• Repeated Competition
• Appendix To Chapter 10: Mixed Strategies
• Chapter 11 Regulation, Public Goods, And Benefit-Cost Analysis
• I Market Failures And Regulation
• Market Failure Due To Monopoly
• Government Responses
• Market Failure Due To Externalities
• Remedying Externalities
• Subsidizing Positive Externalities
• Market Failure Due To Imperfect Information
• II Benefit-Cost Analysis And Public Goods Provision
• Public Goods
• Public Goods And Efficiency
• The Basics Of Benefit-Cost Analysis
• Applying The Net Benefit Rule
• Dollar Values
• Efficiency Versus Equity
• Evaluating A Public Project
• Public Investment In A Bridge
• Valuing Benefits And Costs
• Market Values
• Nonmarketed Benefits And Costs
• Section III Decision-Making Applications
• Chapter 12 Decision Making Under Uncertainty
• Uncertainty, Probability, And Expected Value
• Expected Value
• Decision Trees
• An Oil Drilling Problem
• Features Of The Expected-Value Criterion
• Sequential Decisions
• Risk Aversion
• Expected Utility
• Expected Utility And Risk Aversion
• Chapter 13 The Value Of Information
• The Value Of Information
• The Oil Wildcatter Revisited
• Imperfect Information
• Revising Probabilities
• Bayes Theorem
• Other Applications
• Predicting Credit Risks
• Intuitive Prediction
• Business Behavior And Decision Pitfalls
• Optimal Search
• Optimal Stopping
• Optimal Sequential Decisions
• The Value Of Additional Alternatives
• Simultaneous Search
• Chapter 14 Asymmetric Information And Organizational Design
• Asymetric Information
• Adverse Selection
• Signalling
• Principals, Agents, And Moral Hazard
• Organizational Design
• The Nature Of The Firm
• The Breadth Of The Firm
• Assigning Decision-Making Responsibilities
• Monitoring And Rewarding Performance
• Separation Of Ownership And Control In The Modern Corporation
• Appendix To Chapter 14: A Principal-Agent Model
• Chapter 15 Bargaining And Negotiation
• The Economic Sources Of Beneficial Agreements
• Resolving Disputes
• Differences In Values
• Contingent Contracts
• Multiple-Issue Negotiations
• Continuous Variablee
• Negotiation Strategy
• Perfect Information
• Imperfect Information
• Chapter 16 Actions And Competitive Bidding
• The Advantages Of Auctions
• Bidder Strategies
• English And Dutch Auctions
• Sealed-Bid Auctions
• Common Values And The Winner's Curse
• Optimal Auctions
• Expected Auction Revenue
• Competitive Procurement
• Chapter 17 Linear Programming
• Linear Programs
• Graphing The LP Problem
• A Minimization Problem
• Sensitivity Analysis And Shadow Prices
• Changes In The Objective Function
• Shadow Prices
• Formulation And Computer Solution
• For Larger LP Problems
• Computer Solutions
• Answers To Odd-Numbered Questions

Notas de autor provistas por Syndetics

William F. Samuelson is professor of economics and finance at Boston University School of Management. He received his B.A. and Ph.D. from Harvard University. His research interests include game theory, decision theory, bidding, bargaining, and experimental economics. He has published a variety of articles in leading economics and management science journals including The American Economic Review, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Econometrica, The Journal of Finance, Management Service, and Operations Research . His teaching and research have been sponsored by the National Science Foundation and National Institute for Dispute Resolution, among others. He is currently on the editorial boards fo the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization and Group Decision and Negotiation .