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El origen del presente volumen lo constituyen las conversaciones que mantuvieron en el verano de 1979 Franz Kreuzer, prestigioso periodista austriaco, y Karl R. Popper, uno de los filosofos mas importantes de nuestro siglo. Que el rigor cientifico no esta renido con la capacidad divulgativa y que esta no significa necesariamente B+vulgarizacionB; podra comprobarlo facilmente el lector que se acerque a estas paginas. Popper repasa tanto los temas que a lo largo de mas de medio siglo han sido objeto de su reflexion filosofica, como a los pensadores y corrientes filosoficas con respecto a las cuales Popper ha asumido una deuda intelectual critica. El falibilismo metodologico, la critica al neopositivismo del Circulo de Viena, la teoria evolutiva del conocimiento, el darwinismo epistemologico son algunos de los temas abordados junto con muy agudas observaciones que tienen como objeto el pensamiento de Wingenstein o Bolzano, por ejemplo. F. Kreuzer no olvida interrogar a Popper sobre su filosofia social y politica, tema de enorme importancia y que, paradojicamente, no puede decirse que haya sido estudiado de modo exhaustivo; de hecho, la bibliografia en castellano es practicamente inexistente. A este respecto es de fundamental importancia el ensayo de Popper B+Tolerancia y responsabilidad intelectualB; , que la presente edicion incluye.

Notas de autor provistas por Syndetics

Although he writes widely in philosophy, Sir Karl Raimund Popper is best known for his thesis that an empirical statement is meaningless unless conditions can be specified that could show it to be false. He was born and educated in Vienna, where he was associated with, although not actually a member of, the Vienna Circle. Two years after the German publication of his Logic of Scientific Discovery (1935), he left Austria for New Zealand, where he was senior lecturer at the University of Canterbury. In 1945 he moved to England and began a distinguished career at the London School of Economics and Political Science. According to Popper, there is no "method of discovery" in science. His view holds that science advances by brilliant but unpredictable conjectures that then stand up well against attempts to refute them. This view was roundly criticized by more dogmatic positivists, on the one hand, and by Feyerabend and Kuhn, on the other. In 1945 he published The Open Society and Its Enemies, which condemns Plato, Georg Hegel, and Karl Marx as progenitors of totalitarianism and opponents of freedom. The scholarship that underpins this book remains controversial. Popper's later works continue his interest in philosophy of science and also develop themes in epistemology and philosophy of mind. He is particularly critical of historicism, which he regards as an attitude that fosters a deplorable tendency toward deterministic thinking in the social sciences. (Bowker Author Biography)