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Change in View offers an entirely original approach to the philosophical study of reasoning by identifying principles of reasoning with principles for revising one's beliefs and intentions and not with principles of logic. This crucial observation leads to a number of important and interesting consequences that impinge on psychology and artificial intelligence as well as on various branches of philosophy, from epistemology to ethics and action theory. Gilbert Harman is Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University. A Bradford Book.

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Harman (Princeton University) explores the principles humans employ when they change their beliefs. He reaches the unorthodox conclusion that the principles of deductive logic are not of particular relevance to principles of reasoning. Harman claims that reasoning should be distinguished from argument. Some of the principles of reasoning he identifies are the principle of clutter avoidance, the interest condition, the principle of conservatism, the principle of positive undermining, and the get back principle. He argues for a coherence theory of belief revision-where coherence is explained in terms of intelligibility connections-and against a foundationalist approach. Included among the topics covered are the distinction between implicit and explicit beliefs; tentative versus full belief acceptance; individual versus group belief acceptance; measuring change in view; explanation; practical versus theoretical reasoning; intentions; and desires. Original, provocative, well written, and well reasoned, the book should be in the library of every college and university where philosophy is taught.-H. Pospesel, University of Miami