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Market societies have created more wealth, and more opportunities for more people, than any other system of social organization in history. Yet we still have a rudimentary understanding of how markets themselves are social constructions that require extensive institutional support. This groundbreaking work seeks to fill this gap, to make sense of modern capitalism by developing a sociological theory of market institutions. Addressing the unruly dynamism that capitalism brings with it, leading sociologist Neil Fligstein argues that the basic drift of any one market and its actors, even allowing for competition, is toward stabilization.



The Architecture of Markets represents a major and timely step beyond recent, largely empirical studies that oppose the neoclassical model of perfect competition but provide sparse theory toward a coherent economic sociology. Fligstein offers this theory. With it he interprets not just globalization and the information economy, but developments more specific to American capitalism in the past two decades--among them, the 1980s merger movement. He makes new inroads into the ''theory of fields,'' which links the formation of markets and firms to the problems of stability. His political-cultural approach explains why governments remain crucial to markets and why so many national variations of capitalism endure. States help make stable markets possible by, for example, establishing the rule of law and adjudicating the class struggle. State-building and market-building go hand in hand.


Fligstein shows that market actors depend mightily upon governments and the members of society for the social conditions that produce wealth. He demonstrates that systems favoring more social justice and redistribution can yield stable markets and economic growth as readily as less egalitarian systems. This book will surely join the classics on capitalism. Economists, sociologists, policymakers, and all those interested in what makes markets function as they do will read it for many years to come.

Tabla de contenidos provista por Syndetics

• List of Tables(p. xi)
• Preface(p. xiii)
• 1. Bringing Sociology Back In(p. 3)
• A Critique of the Existing Literature in the Sociology of Markets(p. 6)
• Theoretical Questions for a Sociology of Markets(p. 10)
• A Political-Cultural Approach(p. 15)
• Structure of the Book(p. 20)
• Normative Implications of the Political-Cultural Approach to the Sociology of Markets(p. 21)
• Part I (p. 25)
• 2. Markets as Institutions(p. 27)
• Market Institutions: Basic Definitions(p. 28)
• State Building and Market Building(p. 36)
• Power in Policy Domains and Market Institutions(p. 42)
• 3. The Politics of the Creation of Market Institutions(p. 45)
• Political Structuring of Labor Market Institutions(p. 53)
• Policy Domains and Market Regulation in Real Societies(p. 56)
• Stability and Complexity(p. 59)
• Implications for Research(p. 62)
• Conclusion(p. 64)
• 4. The Theory of Fields and the Problem of Market Formation(p. 67)
• Markets as Fields(p. 67)
• The Goal of Action in Stable Markets(p. 70)
• The Problem of Change and Stability in Markets(p. 75)
• Links between Market Formation and States(p. 86)
• Some Macro Implications of the Theory of Fields(p. 89)
• Globalization and Market Processes(p. 94)
• Conclusion(p. 97)
• Part II (p. 99)
• 5. The Logic of Employment Systems(p. 101)
• Employment Systems as Institutional Projects(p. 103)
• Variations and Transformations in Employment Systems(p. 107)
• The Dynamics of Systems of Employment Relations(p. 108)
• Insights into Comparative Employment Systems(p. 111)
• Research Agendas(p. 117)
• Conclusion(p. 120)
• 6. The Dynamics of U.S. Firms and the Issue of Ownership and Control in the 1970s(p. 123)
• Review of the Literature(p. 124)
• Management versus Owner Control(p. 125)
• Bank Control(p. 126)
• Market Dynamics and Management Control(p. 128)
• Hypotheses(p. 130)
• Data and Methods(p. 132)
• Results(p. 136)
• Discussion and Conclusions(p. 144)
• Appendix A(p. 146)
• 7. The Rise of the Shareholder Value Conception of the Firm and the Merger Movement in the 1980s(p. 147)
• What Is to Be Explained?(p. 150)
• Finance Economics(p. 151)
• Manager, Owner, and Bank Control(p. 153)
• The Crisis of the Finance Conception of Control and the Rise of the Shareholder Value Conception of Control(p. 155)
• Hypotheses(p. 157)
• Data and Methods(p. 158)
• Results(p. 162)
• Conclusion(p. 166)
• 8. Corporate Control in Capitalist Societies(p. 170)
• Economic Theories and Mechanisms(p. 172)
• Sociological Theories of Control(p. 176)
• Comparative Cases(p. 181)
• Conclusion(p. 189)
• 9. Globalization(p. 191)
• Definitions of Globalization(p. 193)
• Critique of Globalization Arguments(p. 195)
• The Slow Expansion and Unevenness of Global Trade(p. 196)
• Change or Continuity in the Organization of Production?(p. 203)
• Does Globalization Cause Deindustrialization and Inequality?(p. 206)
• Politics, Governments, and Financial Markets(p. 209)
• Trade, Competition, Industrial Policy, and the Welfare State(p. 213)
• Globalization and Neoliberalism as an American Project(p. 220)
• Conclusion(p. 221)
• 10. Conclusions(p. 223)
• Two Tales of One Industry(p. 223)
• Stability and Efficiency(p. 228)
• Efficiency, Stability, and Equity(p. 231)
• Conclusion(p. 236)
• Notes(p. 239)
• Bibliography(p. 247)
• Index(p. 269)

Notas de autor provistas por Syndetics

Neil Fligstein is Professor of Sociology and Class of 1939 Chancellor's Professor at the University of California, Berkeley