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Library Journal Review

Summers's latest book is mistitled: its focus is not the Gulf War, but rather the renaissance of the U.S. military after the dark days of Vietnam. Summers argues perceptively and accurately that for 40 years, nuclear-tipped superpower diplomacy generated a defensive national strategy that was neither fully understood nor adequately explained. Only as containment of the Soviet Union gave way to cooperation did the offensive once again become a viable U.S. option. But the military system that translated political circumstances into battlefield victory was the product of comprehensive restructuring in the post-Vietnam armed forces. Separately and together, the services after 1975 found the moral courage to face their institutional shortcomings and develop the methods and doctrines so brilliantly successful in the Persian Gulf. Summers's clear account of the processes and personalities involved in America's military rebirth will inform general readers and provoke specialist inquiry. Recommended for all collections.-- D.E. Showalter, U.S. Air Force Acad., Colorado Springs (c) Copyright 2010. Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.

Publishers Weekly Review

Military strategist Summers ( On Strategy : A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War ), who made some 125 television appearances during the Gulf war, here argues persuasively that changes in U.S. military doctrine, undertaken after the Vietnam war, helped U.S. forces prevail in the Gulf. Summers looks at overall strategy, not daily tactics. In Vietnam, he notes, the U.S. failed to follow the lesson of the classic war theorist Karl von Clausewitz: a successful war depends on public support. In the Gulf, Summers argues, such support was generated by participation of the reserves and the announcement of clear war goals. Moreover, after Vietnam, the military gave up its Cold War doctrine of limited war, its branches learned to work together and commanders finally stressed the training of troops for battle rather than troop maintenance and management. However, Summers fails to examine the role of oil in U.S war aims or why U.S. forces allowed Saddam Hussein to remain in power. He approvingly cites the international and Middle East coalitions against Iraq without noting the considerable arm-twisting by the U.S. Such lack of skepticism is perhaps predictable in a book dedicated to Summers's friend and Leavenworth classmate Gen. Colin Powell. (Feb.) (c) Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved

Booklist Review

Summers was in the phalanx of military talking heads during the late Persian Gulf War, proffering instantaneous tactical commentary or speculation to an expectant TV audience. Given the passage of the months since, one might anticipate this being his more reflective sorting out, a critical analysis, of the blow-by-blow events culminating in the allied victory. It's not. Rather, the text discusses the army's agonizing doctrinal reappraisals following the Vietnam conflict, which paved the officer corps' mental way to success. In a nutshell, the whiz kids' systems analysis was out, and von Clausewitz was in. Well, what's the risk in peeling off a fin for this title, especially when its redeeming appendix contains the mother of all briefings by General Schwarzkopf? ~--Gilbert Taylor