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This first truly international history of the Korean War argues that by its timing, its course, and its outcome it functioned as a substitute for World War III. Stueck draws on recently available materials from seven countries, plus the archives of the United Nations, presenting a detailed narrative of the diplomacy of the conflict and a broad assessment of its critical role in the Cold War. He emphasizes the contribution of the United Nations, which at several key points in the conflict provided an important institutional framework within which less powerful nations were able to restrain the aggressive tendencies of the United States.


In Stueck's view, contributors to the U.N. cause in Korea provided support not out of any abstract commitment to a universal system of collective security but because they saw an opportunity to influence U.S. policy. Chinese intervention in Korea in the fall of 1950 brought with it the threat of world war, but at that time and in other instances prior to the armistice in July 1953, America's NATO allies and Third World neutrals succeeded in curbing American adventurism. While conceding the tragic and brutal nature of the war, Stueck suggests that it helped to prevent the occurrence of an even more destructive conflict in Europe.

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• List of Maps(p. ix)
• Acknowledgments(p. xi)
• Introduction(p. 3)
• Chapter 1 The Origins of the Korean War(p. 10)
• Chapter 2 The Diplomacy of Confrontation and Consolidation(p. 47)
• Chapter 3 Diplomacy Fails: The UN Counteroffensive and Chinese Intervention(p. 85)
• Chapter 4 Limiting the War(p. 127)
• Chapter 5 The Dimensions of Collective Action(p. 167)
• Chapter 6 Armistice Talks: Origins and Initial Stages(p. 204)
• Chapter 7 Progress(p. 236)
• Chapter 8 Deadlock(p. 268)
• Chapter 9 Concluding an Armistice(p. 308)
• Chapter 10 The Korean War as International History(p. 348)
• Notes(p. 371)
• Bibliography(p. 447)

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CHOICE Review

It can be argued reasonably that diplomacy in so-called limited wars is often more complex than in other conflicts. Wars not resolved quickly tend to stalemate militarily, leaving diplomats to finish things. This concept is illustrated in Stueck's study of the Korean War's torturous diplomacy. The conflict began with a year of mobile warfare followed by stabilization of the battle line just north of the 38th Parallel; it ended only after another two years of difficult negotiations. The diplomatic complexity stemmed from the involvement of more than 20 countries on both sides, each with widely differing perspectives. For example, South Korea and the US usually took a more aggressive approach to the war's military and diplomatic aspects, while their allies were more moderate. The communist side suffered similar divisions, but not to the same extent. Even greater gaps between the UN side and the communists slowed the final settlement. Stueck concludes that the Korean War contributed to the remilitarization of the NATO countries, eventually encouraged the Sino-Soviet split, and possibly prevented a larger war. This is a strong history of the conflict's diplomacy. Given the nature of the available sources, the work is likely to be definitive. Upper-division undergraduates and above. P. L. de Rosa; Bridgewater State College

Notas de autor provistas por Syndetics

William Stueck is Professor of History at the University of Georgia