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This book details the policy subsystems - links among members of Congress, interest groups, program beneficiaries, federal and subnational government agencies - that blanket the American political landscape. Robert Stein and Kenneth Bickers have constructed a database detailing federal outlays to Congressional districts for each federal program, and use it to examine four myths about the impact of policy subsystems on American government and democratic practice. These include the myth that policy subsystems are a major contributor to the federal deficit; that once created, federal programs grow inexorably and rarely die; that to garner support for their programs, subsystem actors seek to universalize the geographic scope of program benefits; and that the flow of program benefits to constituencies in congressional districts ensures the re-election of legislators.

Tabla de contenidos provista por Syndetics

• Part I
• 1 Policy subsystems and the pork barrel
• Part II
• 2 The Programmatic expansion of US domestic spending
• 3 The geographic scope of domestic spending: a test of the universalism thesis
• Part III
• 4 A portfolio theory of policy subsystems
• 5 PAC contributions and the distribution of domestic assistance programs
• 6 Policy subsystem adaptability and resilience in the Reagan period
• 7 Congressional elections and the pork barrel
• Part IV
• 8 Policy subsystems in practice and democratic theory
• Appendices

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CHOICE Review

The authors (Rice and Indiana Univ.) explore American public policy making at the federal level. Their conceptual tool is the policy subsystem, which is not as closed as the iron triangle nor as open as the issue network. The word "system" is taken seriously; Stein and Bickers see the politics of civilian distributive programs composed of cooperating actors who gain individually by symbiotic relationships of mutual assistance. Although their system embraces the familiar triad of congressmen, bureaucracies, and interest groups, the authors go beyond past analyses by arguing (with support from data) that legislators do not "buy" constituent votes through district projects but create programs and make awards in relatively few districts, which earn PAC support to reelect all supporting members of Congress. Meanwhile, bureaucracies benefit from the appropriations but contribute to the system by generating constituent support and hence interest group influence. In a "portfolio" image of strategic manipulation, the authors suggest that each subsystem manages its "bundle" of federal programs to secure steady political yield at minimum risk. The book rectifies previous research by showing that pork barrel politics is more interactive and complex than had been thought and reports interesting specific findings (e.g., in the period 1971-90 an average of 57 federal programs were created and 36 eliminated each year). One might object that administrative agencies do not strategize only for their own resources but carry out statutorily mandated missions in behalf of public needs. This fine book should occupy an enduring place in the policy-making literature. Upper-division undergraduates through faculty. C. T. Goodsell Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University