Cost, Uncertainty, and Welfare Frank Knight's Theory of Imperfect Competition Stephen John Nash.
Detalles de publicación: Brookfield, VT Ashgate Pub. Co. 1998.Descripción: viii, 205 p. 22 cmISBN:- 1840145854
- 330.155 N253c 1998
- HB238 .N37 1998
| Imagen de cubierta | Tipo de ítem | Biblioteca actual | Biblioteca de origen | Colección | Ubicación en estantería | Signatura topográfica | Materiales especificados | Info Vol | URL | Copia número | Estado | Notas | Fecha de vencimiento | Código de barras | Reserva de ítems | Prioridad de la cola de reserva de ejemplar | Reservas para cursos | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Libro | Biblioteca de Mayagüez Colección General mb | HB238 .N37 1998 (Navegar estantería(Abre debajo)) | Disponible | 50000002115276 |
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Descripciones mejoradas de Syndetics:
This work contributes to the discussion of Knight by showing that uncertainty broadens the conception of economic welfare, and that a new cost analysis holds the key to unlocking the Knightian corpus. It develops Knight's suggestion that uncertainty-control costs can be reduced - arguing that the large firm enjoys economic rent from utilizing its dominant vantage point in the market. The author demonstrates that while Knight provides the intellectual stimulus which propelled Chamberlin's thesis of monopolistic competition, Chamberlin uses a very abstract form of uncertainty in his analysis.
Includes bibliographical references and index
Tabla de contenidos provista por Syndetics
- List of Figures(p. vi)
- Preface(p. vii)
- Acknowledgments(p. viii)
- 1 Introduction(p. 1)
- 2 The Knightian Pyramid(p. 8)
- 3 Intellectual Influences(p. 49)
- 4 Comparison of Knight with Chamberlin and Robinson(p. 93)
- 5 Some Policy Implications(p. 126)
- 6 Conclusion(p. 159)
- Bibliography(p. 166)
- Index(p. 200)