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In the first comprehensive institutional and operational history of the Imperial Russian Army during the crucial period of its modernization, Bruce W. Menning surveys the development of organization, doctrine, and strategy from the aftermath of Russia's defeat in the Crimean War through the wars against Turkey in 1877-1878 and Japan in 1904-1905, to the eve of World War I. Menning weaves analysis of reforms in technology and military an with lively accounts of combat operations and portraits of the personalities involved. Enhanced by superb battlefield maps, operational diagrams, and rare photographs of the leading Russian military commanders, Bayonets before Bullets offers a fascinating account of the Russian Army's struggle to modernize during a critical era of change.

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• Acknowledgments(p. ix)
• Introduction(p. 1)
• The Army of(p. 6)
• Russo-Turkish War, 1877-1878(p. 51)
• The Army of(p. 87)
• The Legacy of(p. 123)
• Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905(p. 152)
• Theory and Structure, 1905-1914: Young Turks and Old Realities(p. 200)
• Dilemmas of Design and Application, 1905-1914(p. 238)
• Conclusions(p. 272)
• Notes(p. 279)
• Bibliography(p. 309)
• Index(p. 329)

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Publishers Weekly Review

In his outstanding institutional and doctrinal history of the Russian army from the military reforms following the Crimean War to the outbreak of war in 1914, Menning, a U.S. Army analyst, discusses how the army prepared itself to fight in an era of dramatic technological, social and political change. He convincingly argues that the Russian army's ultimate failure involved linkages: its parts never meshed into a coherent whole. To illustrate his case, he analyzes the Russo-Turkish (1878-1879) and Russo-Japanese (1904-1905) wars. Masterpieces of conception and execution, these studies highlight the structural weaknesses of the late Tsarist empire, as well as the army's continued reliance on Napoleonic models. The accelerating pace and widening scale of modern military operations, he maintains, created insoluble dilemmas for soldiers trained to trust willpower and cold steel as the keys to victory. Illustrations not seen by PW. (Nov.) (c) Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved

CHOICE Review

A very thorough and important study on the theory of war-making in the late Russian empire from the aftermath of the Crimean War to the eve of WW I. Menning treats wars as an intellectual rather than a human problem. War-making for him is a puzzle put together by strategists and generals, and therein hides the paradox and fascination of the book. On the one hand, his detachment from moral concern may repulse the reader; on the other hand, one cannot help but be pulled into the intellectual processes that war planners underwent. Although military historians are the most likely readers of the work, general historians of Russia could profit from it, because the study cuts across numerous disciplines: statecraft, diplomacy, economy, and technology. The collapse of Russia's empire had many causes; Menning implies that the faulty planning of Russia's military strategists, in spite of arduous efforts, was one of them. Thorough index and bibliography, footnotes, and numerous illustrations. Recommended for all college libraries supporting programs in Russian history. Advanced undergraduate; graduate; faculty. A. Ezergailis; Ithaca College