Descripciones mejoradas de Syndetics:

Questions about the relationship between autonomy and authority are raised in nearly every area of moral philosophy. Although the most ob­ vious of these is political philosophy (especially the philosophy of law), the issues surrounding this relationship are by no means confined to this area. Indeed, as we shall see as this work progresses, the issues raised are central to moral psychology, religion, professional ethics, medical ethics, and the nature of moral systems generally. Although the title of this work is Autonomy. Authority and Moral Responsibility. we shall be concerned with the more general question about the relationship between autonomy (or self-direction) and exter­ nal influences, which I take to be any guide to behavior whose presence, content or substance is dependent upon something beyond the control of the agent. Something is beyond the control of the agent if the agent cannot determine whether or not it is present, what its content consists of, or whether or not (or in what way) it influences her. These "external" influences may include (but are not necessarily limited to) religious con­ victions (which guide behavior according to a doctrine whose content is established independently of the agent); moral obligations (which re­ quire action in accordance with some moral theory); and desires for ob­ jects or states of affairs whose presence (or absence) is beyond the con­ trol of the agent. Of course, external influences may also include the requirements of authority or law.

Tabla de contenidos provista por Syndetics

• Introduction(p. 1)
• Part 1 Autonomy(p. 9)
• Chapter 1 The Importance of Autonomy(p. 11)
• Autonomy as a Presupposition of Rules(p. 17)
• The Presupposition of Self-Control in the Law(p. 20)
• The Relationship Between Autonomy and Rules(p. 23)
• Self-Control and Threats to Responsibility(p. 25)
• Chapter 2 The Concept of Autonomy(p. 33)
• Autonomy as Autarkeia(p. 38)
• Autarkeia in Aristotle(p. 38)
• Autarkeia in Kant(p. 40)
• The Inadequacy of Autarkeia for Practical Autonomy(p. 47)
• Autonomy as Self-Rule(p. 48)
• Chapter 3 Developing the Helmsman Metaphor(p. 55)
• Identifying Helmsmanship(p. 62)
• Compulsion(p. 64)
• Coercion(p. 66)
• The Sensible Man(p. 68)
• An Adequate Range of Options(p. 71)
• Conclusion(p. 72)
• Chapter 4 Addressing Kant's Concerns(p. 75)
• Desires and Motivation(p. 78)
• Freedom of Will vs. Freedom of Action(p. 80)
• Motivation vs. Causation(p. 83)
• Akrasia(p. 85)
• Summary of "Part One: Autonomy"(p. 94)
• Part 2 Authority(p. 97)
• Introduction to Part Two(p. 99)
• Chapter 5 Autonomy and Normative Obligation(p. 107)
• Practical Reason and Obligation(p. 113)
• The Concept of Second-Order Reasons(p. 115)
• A Second Concept of Second-Order Reasons(p. 117)
• The Importance of the Distinction(p. 119)
• Normative Principles(p. 121)
• Chapter 6 Authority and Obligation(p. 125)
• I. The Nature of Authority(p. 127)
• Varieties of Authoritative Directives(p. 130)
• The Simple Requirement of Action(p. 130)
• Sophisticated Directives(p. 133)
• Conditional Directives(p. 133)
• The Exclusion of Behavior Theory(p. 134)
• II. Reconciling Autonomy and Authority(p. 136)
• Voluntary Slavery(p. 137)
• The Dependence Thesis(p. 139)
• The Dependence Thesis Revised(p. 141)
• The Limits of Authority(p. 144)
• Chapter 7 Autonomy and the Authority of Law(p. 149)
• On the Obligation to Obey the Law(p. 155)
• Arguments Against An Obligation to Obey the Law(p. 158)
• The Debate in Context(p. 163)
• A Two-Level Model of the Obligation to Obey the Law(p. 165)
• The Revised Dependence Thesis and the Law(p. 168)
• Toward a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law(p. 171)
• Bibliography(p. 175)