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Since the mid-1970s American presidents have, with growing frequency, claimed that they have the power to ignore any law they believe is unconstitutional. Beginning with a review of the English constitutional backdrop against which the U.S. Constitution was framed, this book demonstrates that the Founders did not intend to confer on the president a power equivalent to the royal prerogative of suspending the laws, which was stripped from the English Crown in 1689. The author examines each of the nearly 150 instances in which presidents from George Washington to Jimmy Carter have objected to the validity of a law, in order to determine whether or not the president then ignored the law in question. This examination of the historical record reveals that prior to the mid-1970s the White House only rarely failed to honor a law that it believed to be unconstitutional.

Tabla de contenidos provista por Syndetics

• Tables(p. ix)
• Preface(p. xi)
• Introduction(p. xiii)
• Part I. The Original Understanding
• 1. The Royal Suspending and Dispensing Powers(p. 3)
• 2. The Founders' Understanding(p. 9)
• Part II. Presidential Practice, 1789-1981
• 3. Presidential Practice: Introduction(p. 45)
• 4. Laws Enacted over a Constitutionally Based Veto(p. 53)
• 5. Signing Statements: Introduction(p. 71)
• 6. Signing Statements: Acquiescence, Avoidance, and Compliance(p. 81)
• 7. Signing Statements: Noncompliance(p. 101)
• 8. Laws Enacted During a Prior Administration(p. 119)
• 9. Presidential Practice: A Summary of the Historical Record(p. 127)
• 10. Limiting Presidential Defiance(p. 141)
• Notes(p. 155)
• Selected Bibliography(p. 199)
• Index(p. 205)

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CHOICE Review

This is an excellent study in the tradition of the Imperial Presidency. The author states that the Supreme Court has "not directly addressed the issue of whether the president may refuse to comply with a law that he believes is unconstitutional." In two opinions Justice Scalia has suggested presidents can so refuse. May disagrees. First, he shows that the broadest Founder-era interpretation of the first sentence of Article II of the Constitution gave the president prerogatives "enjoyed by the Crown in 1787." The Glorious Revolution eliminated the Crown's prerogative to suspend laws believed to be unconstitutional. Second, May shows in the main portion of the book that between 1789 and 1981 presidents claimed 145 laws were unconstitutional. Twenty were defied, ten since 1973. He concludes that the claimed presidential power to defy laws believed unconstitutional, though not ruled so by the courts, is "too late in the day" to be acquired by prescription. May notes presidents have stated 200 statutes to be unconstitutional between 1981 and 1996. This study is an initial scholarly effort likely to be cited in appellate briefs the next time presidential refusal to comply with a law that he or she believes is unconstitutional goes to the courts. Upper-division undergraduates and above. T. M. Jackson; Marywood University

Notas de autor provistas por Syndetics

Christopher N. May is the James P. Bradley Professor of Constitutional Law at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles