Law of public choice a critical introduction Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey.
Detalles de publicación: Chicago University of Chicago Press 1991.Descripción: 159 p. 24 cmISBN:- 0226238024 (alk. paper)
- 0226238032 (pbk : alk. paper)
- K 487.E3 F37 1991
| Imagen de cubierta | Tipo de ítem | Biblioteca actual | Biblioteca de origen | Colección | Ubicación en estantería | Signatura topográfica | Materiales especificados | Info Vol | URL | Copia número | Estado | Notas | Fecha de vencimiento | Código de barras | Reserva de ítems | Prioridad de la cola de reserva de ejemplar | Reservas para cursos | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Libro | Biblioteca de Derecho Mons. Fremiot Torres Oliver Colección General biblioteca derecho | K 487.E3 F37 1991 (Navegar estantería(Abre debajo)) | Disponible | 70000000638721 |
Descripciones mejoradas de Syndetics:
In Law and Public Choice , Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey present a remarkably rich
and accessible introduction to the driving principles of public choice. In this, the first
systematic look at the implications of social choice for legal doctrine, Farber and Frickey
carefully review both the empirical and theoretical literature about interest group influence and provide a nonmathematical introduction to formal models of legislative action. Ideal for course use, this volume offers a balanced and perceptive analysis and critique of an approach which, within limits, can illuminate the dynamics of government decision-making.
" Law and Public Choice is a most valuable contribution to the burgeoning literature. It
should be of great interest to lawyers, political scientists, and all others interested in issues at the intersection of government and law."--Cass R. Sunstein, University of Chicago Law
School
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Tabla de contenidos provista por Syndetics
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 Interest Groups and the Political Process
- I The Impact of Interest Group Theory
- II Interest Groups and Political Science
- III The Economic Theory of Legislation
- IV Normative Implications
- 2 Arrow's Theorem and the Democratic Process
- I Arrow's Theorem and Its Implications
- II Republicanism
- III Chaos and Coherence in Legislatures
- IV Public Choice and Legislative Deliberation
- 3 Economic Regulation and the Constitution
- I Economic Rights and the Constitution
- II Federalism
- III The Delegation Doctrine
- 4 Statutory Interpretation
- I Legislative Intent
- II Legislative History
- III Ambiguous Language and Rational Choice
- IV Statutory Evolution
- 5 Integrating Public Choice and Public Law
- I Existing Strands of "Due Process of Lawmaking"
- II Expanding the Influence of Public Choice in Public Law Epilogue: Beyond the Economic Sphere
- Index