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These readings have been specifically selected to further the reader's understanding of the economic approach to law. They focus on the distinguishing characteristics of economics as a way of thinking, as well as comparing and contrasting economic analysis with more traditional methods of legal analysis. You'll also find authoritative notes and commentary. This text is an excellent facilitator of thought-provoking classroom discussions. Other topics include methodology of the economic approach, a survey of basic applications, and critiques of the economic approach.

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• 1 Methodology of the economic approach
• 1.1 Behavioral premises
• The Economic Approach to Human Behavior
• 1.2 Normative premises
• Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization
• Economic Reasoning and the Ethics of Policy
• 1.3 Models and modeling
• The Distinction Between Positive and Negative Economics
• The Methodology of Positive Economics
• Notes and questions
• 2 Two competing economic models of law
• 2.1 The model of market failure
• Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts
• Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution
• 2.2 The model of private cooperation
• The Nature of the Firm
• The Problem of Social Cost
• 2.3 Comparing the models: transaction costs
• When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?
• Notes and questions
• 3 A survey of basic applications
• 3.1 Property
• Toward a Theory of Property Rights
• Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral
• 3.2 Tort
• The Learned Hand Formula for Determining Liability
• Strict Liability Versus Negligence
• 3.3 Contract
• The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of Contract Remedies
• 3.4 Criminal law
• Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach
• 3.5 Procedure
• An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration
• Detrebling Versus Decoupling Antitrust Damages: Lessons from the Theory of Enforcement
• Notes and questions
• 4 Refining the model: strategic behavior
• 4.1 Theory
• The Cost of Coase
• Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior
• 4.2 Applications
• Injury, Ignorance, and Spite: The Dynamics of Coercive Collection
• A Model in Which Suits are Brought for Their Nuisance Value
• The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance
• An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm
• Notes and questions
• 5 Refining the model, II: risk and insurance
• 5.1 Theory
• The Allocation of Risk and the Theory of Insurance
• 5.2 Applications
• Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis
• The First-Party Insurance Externality: An Economic Justification for Enterprise Liability
• An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions
• The Optimal Trade-Off between the Probability and the Magnitude of Fines
• Notes and questions
• 6 Refining the model, III: information
• 6.1 Theory
• The Economics of Information
• The Market for Lemons: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
• 6.2 Applications
• The Contract-Tort Boundary and the Economics of Insurance
• The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality
• The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication