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The call to "reinvent government"--to reform the government bureaucracy of the United States--resonates as loudly from elected officials as from the public. Examining the political and economic forces that have shaped the American civil service system from its beginnings in 1883 through today, the authors of this volume explain why, despite attempts at an overhaul, significant change in the bureaucracy remains a formidable challenge.

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• Acknowledgments
• 1 The "Problem of Bureaucracy
• 2 Replacing Political Patronage with Merit: The Roles of the President and the Congress in the Origins of the Federal Civil Service System
• 3 The Continuing Political Conflict over Control of Federal Employees and the Requirement for Further Institutional Change
• 4 The Rise of Federal Employees as an Interest Group: The Early Years
• 5 The Maturation of Federal Employees as an Interest Group
• 6 Explaining the Success of Federal Employees as an Interest Group
• 7 The Implications of a Protected Bureaucracy
• 8 The Economics and Politics of Institutional Change in the Political Arena
• Appendix A Appendix to Chapter 2
• Appendix B Appendix to Chapter 3
• Appendix C Appendix to Chapter 5
• Appendix D Appendix to Chapter 6
• References
• Index

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CHOICE Review

This book is really two things: (1) a history of the evolution of the Federal Civil Service, and (2) an analysis of its implications using the concepts and tools of institutional economics. As such, the authors develop an exciting and challenging argument as to problems of bureaucracy, what caused them, and why government cannot do very much to correct these ills. Two historical points are important. First, the development of the Civil Service resulted from continued jockeying between the president and Congress and Democrats and Republicans to disperse power and limit any single set of players from dominant control of administrative resources. In moving away from patronage, protected employees were the only clear winners. The second point emphasizes how, with the support of political resources yielded by elected officials, the Federal Civil Service came to function primarily as an organized interest group, mostly through its unions. The result is a federal bureaucracy that is not much subject to change, increased productivity, or improved accountability, no matter how much we "reinvent government." The costs of renegotiating transactions that protect civil servants, and should never have been made in the first place, are simply too high for government to bear. An excellent and well-written but controversial book--institutional economics at its best. Upper-division undergraduate through faculty. W. P. Browne; Central Michigan University