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Library Journal Review

Homet, an international economics/security relations specialist, sets out in this book to portray and understand the ``subsurface dynamics'' that can transform landscapes. In this case, the landscape is U.S.-Soviet relations, and Homet draws on the observation of academics and Soviet specialists in branches of the American media and government to put forward some sensible, low-key proposals for fresh ideas for U.S. policymakers. Such officials should do more than simply react to events, Homet says, and they should also modify long-held notions about the U.S. ability to direct events or lead the anti-Soviet camp. This last is, in any case, dissolving, whether U.S. President George Bush and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher like it or not. This is a welcome guide for the intelligent reader curious about the impact of recent events upon U.S.-Soviet relations.-- R.H. Johnston, McMaster Univ., Hamilton, Ontario (c) Copyright 2010. Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.

Publishers Weekly Review

With the Cold War dissipating, Homet calls for a U.S. policy of ``constructive detachment'' vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. This means America would pursue its geopolitical self-interest, confronting the U.S.S.R. only when absolutely necessary and scaling down its military role as global super-cop. Normalized trade relations, depoliticized cultural exchanges and a minimum nuclear deterrence would undergird this new relationship. Diplomat Homet, who clearly knows his way around the chessboard of international politics, appraises Gorbachev's incremental reforms and concludes that a reformed, efficient Soviet Union would be much less destabilizing to the U.S. than a fragmented, floundering ``evil empire.'' These graceful essays reward with their wide-angled historical perspective and political acuity. (Sept.) (c) Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved

CHOICE Review

This book suffers from the contemporary dilemma of having been written in medias res; it does not progress beyond the situation in late 1989, and events have outrun both its factual basis and its cautionary tone. That is unfortunate because Homet has done a fine job of analysis relevant to his period of study. The problem comes with his attempt to draw too much of his argument into the present evolving milieu. The chief weakness has to do with assumptions about Soviet military and economic strength that seem far too generous to the USSR of 1991. Similarly, the author (like so many of us) places too many difficulties in the way of German reunification (NATO relations, borders, the East German government, etc.), most of which proved less important than was suspected. Further, Homet's narrow definition of glasnost (a Slavonic church term for "voiceness' for a purpose" as opposed to the more accepted definition of "openness" in general) leads him to be too conservative in his views of the possibility for change in the Soviet Union. All of this is ameliorated somewhat by his concluding call for "constructive detachment" as a basis for US policy toward the USSR. One finds favor with his appeal for less ideology and more pragmatism in the US view of the Soviets, more flexibility in US trade policies, and the setting of priorities for foreign policy, even when much of this is, again, more cautionary than seems necessary today. Although readable and interesting, the book would serve mostly as a historical reference point of transition in serious undergraduate and graduate collections in US foreign policy and international relations. -E. M. Coulter, Clemson University

Booklist Review

What's a superpower to do without a cold war to wage? How the U.S. should treat an incipiently more benign rival, but one that is undergoing a retrenchment of unpredictable length and danger, has been the subject of vibrant media debate between Left, Center, and Right. This book is an offering from the Center, and is Homet's distillation of six years of discussions he arranged for members of the foreign policy elite. The gist of their proposals is the replacement of the militarized ideological confrontation that was the cold war with "reciprocal security" and "constructive detachment." Translation: drastically cut arms and revive classic diplomacy a la Talleyrand. Change in that direction is inevitable, and it should start, implies the author, with some mental massaging. Take nuclear doctrine, for example. If MAD (mutual assured destruction) gives you major migraines, Homet as masseur of acronyms will give you peace of MIND (minimum invulnerable nuclear deterrent). A middle-of-the-road manifesto that takes the long view of Russian history, mentions hard-line views for punching-bag effect, and ignores pacifist arguments altogether, this work is for the "politically literate" reader Homet says is his audience. To be indexed. ~--Gilbert Taylor