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A collection of eleven essays dealing with methodological and empirical issues in cognitive science and in the philosophy of mind, Representations convincingly connects philosophical speculation to concrete empirical research. One of the outstanding methodological issues dealt with is the status of functionalism considered as an alternative to behavioristic and physicalistic accounts. of mental states and properties. The other issue is the status of reductionism considered as an account of the relation between the psychological and physical sciences. The first chapters present the main lines of argument which have made functionalism the currently favored philosophical approach to ontology of the mental. The outlines of a psychology of propositional attitudes which emerges from consideration of current developments in cognitive science are contained in the remaining essays. Not all of these essays are re-presentations. The new introductory essay seeks to present an overview and gives some detailed proposals about the contribution that functionalism makes to the solutions of problems about intentionality. The concluding essay, also not previously published, is a sustained examination of the relation between theories about the structure of concepts and theories about how they are learned. Finally, the essay "Three cheers for propositional attitudes", a critical examination of some of D. C. Dennett's ideas, has been completely rewritten for this volume. A Bradford Book.

Tabla de contenidos provista por Syndetics

• Introduction: Something on the State of the Art(p. 1)
• I Functionalism and Realism
• 1 Operationalism and Ordinary Language(p. 35)
• 2 The Appeal to Tacit Knowledge in Psychological Explanations(p. 63)
• 3 What Psychological States are Not(p. 79)
• 4 Three Cheers for Propositional Attitudes(p. 100)
• II Reduction and Unity of Science
• 5 Special Sciences(p. 127)
• 6 Computation and Reduction(p. 146)
• III Intensionality and Mental Representation
• 7 Propositional Attitudes(p. 177)
• 8 Tom Swift and His Procedural Grandmother(p. 204)
• 9 Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology(p. 225)
• IV Nativism
• 10 The Present Status of the Innateness Controversy(p. 257)
• Notes(p. 317)
• References(p. 335)
• Index(p. 341)

Notas de autor provistas por Syndetics

Jerry A. Fodor was born Jerome Alan Fodor in New York City on April 22, 1935. He received a bachelor's degree in philosophy from Columbia University and a Ph.D. in philosophy from Princeton University. He taught at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology from 1959 to 1986, the City University of New York Graduate Center from 1986 to 1988, and Rutgers University from 1988 until his death, when was the State of New Jersey professor of philosophy there.

He was one of the world's foremost philosophers of mind. He wrote several books including The Structure of Language written with Jerrold J. Katz, The Language of Thought, The Modularity of Mind, Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong, The Mind Doesn't Work That Way, and What Darwin Got Wrong written with Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini. He died from complications of Parkinson's disease and a recent stroke on November 29, 2017 at the age of 82.

(Bowker Author Biography)