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Psychosemantics explores the relation between commonsense psychological theories and problems that are central to semantics and the philosophy of language. Building on and extending Fodor's earlier work it puts folk psychology on firm theoretical ground and rebuts externalist, holist, and naturalist threats to its position Jerry A. Fodor is Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University and at the City University of New York Graduate Center. He is the author of Modularity of Mind and RePresentations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science. This book is included in the series Explorations in Cognitive Science, edited by Margaret A. Boden. A Bradford Book.

Tabla de contenidos provista por Syndetics

• Preface
• 1 Introduction: The Persistence of the Attitudes
• 2 Individualism and Supervenience
• 3 Meaning Holism
• 4 Meaning and the World Order
• Epilogue Creation Myth
• Appendix Why There Still Has to be a Language of Thought
• Notes
• References
• Author Index

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Library Journal Review

Cognitivism argues that psychology studies behavior to infer unobservable theoretical constructs, such as `belief,' that summarize and explain empirical observations and predict new phenomena. Here, Fodor tries to provide a scientific account of commonsense belief/desire psychology by defending a representational theory of mind. Assuming that there is no alternative to the vocabulary of commonsense psychological explanation, he proposes that we have an infinite set of mental symbols at our disposal and that a propositional attitude is equivalent to a symbol's occurring and its functioning in a particular causal role. Underlying his account is the view that mental processes will turn out to be physical processes. Highly recommended for philosophers of mind and cognitive psychologists. Robert Hoffman, Philosophy Department, York Coll., CUNY (c) Copyright 2010. Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.

CHOICE Review

Psychosemantics is as enjoyable as it is illuminating. Fodor (CUNY) continues to champion Intentional Psychology (IP), the claim that mature psychological theories will make ineliminable use of intentional idioms (beliefs, desires, etc.), together with the Representational Theory of Mind (RTM), the view that propositional attitudes are relations to mental representations and that mental processes are causal sequences of mental representations. IP has deep roots in common sense, but has been subjected to a series of philosophical objections. We unthinkingly explain a woman's decision to leave her husband by appealing to her belief that he has been unfaithful together with her desire to remain married only to a husband who prizes fidelity. On Fodor's analysis, our explanation here is essentially correct and none the worse for incorporting intentional idioms. The greater portion of Psychosemantics aims to silence the detractors of IP; the discussion of RTM is for the most part relegated to an appendix. Critics of IP have lodged a series of complaints: it is not scientifically motivated; it is platitudinous; it conflicts with methodological individualism; and it conflicts with such received doctrines in the philosophy of language as ``meaning holism'' (see S. Stich, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science, CH, May '84). Fodor deploys a good deal of philosophical ingenuity in addressing these objections and does so with a refreshing verve and wit. Fodor writes with a waggish charm and intellectual candor sadly lacking in many philosophical treatises. This work must be read by all with even a passing interest in cognitive science, and belongs in every collection used by colleges or universities with undergraduate or graduate programs in philosophy, linguistics, or psychology.-C.J. Shields, Colby College

Notas de autor provistas por Syndetics

Jerry A. Fodor was born Jerome Alan Fodor in New York City on April 22, 1935. He received a bachelor's degree in philosophy from Columbia University and a Ph.D. in philosophy from Princeton University. He taught at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology from 1959 to 1986, the City University of New York Graduate Center from 1986 to 1988, and Rutgers University from 1988 until his death, when was the State of New Jersey professor of philosophy there.

He was one of the world's foremost philosophers of mind. He wrote several books including The Structure of Language written with Jerrold J. Katz, The Language of Thought, The Modularity of Mind, Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong, The Mind Doesn't Work That Way, and What Darwin Got Wrong written with Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini. He died from complications of Parkinson's disease and a recent stroke on November 29, 2017 at the age of 82.

(Bowker Author Biography)