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With the incisiveness and lucid style for which he is renowned, Ronald Dworkin has written a masterful explanation of how the Anglo-American legal system works and on what principles it is grounded. Law's Empire is a full-length presentation of his theory of law that will be studied and debated--by scholars and theorists, by lawyers and judges, by students and political activists--for years to come. Dworkin begins with the question that is at the heart of the whole legal system: in difficult cases how do (and how should) judges decide what the law is? He shows that judges must decide hard cases by interpreting rather than simply applying past legal decisions, and he produces a general theory of what interpretation is--in literature as well as in law--and of when one interpretation is better than others. Every legal interpretation reflects an underlying theory about the general character of law: Dworkin assesses three such theories. One, which has been very influential, takes the law of a community to be only what the established conventions of that community say it is. Another, currently in vogue, assumes that legal practice is best understood as an instrument of society to achieve its goals. Dworkin argues forcefully and persuasively against both these views: he insists that the most fundamental point of law is not to report consensus or provide efficient means to social goals, but to answer the requirement that a political community act in a coherent and principled manner toward all its members. He discusses, in the light of that view, cases at common law, cases arising under statutes, and great constitutional cases in the Supreme Court, and he systematically demonstrates that his concept of political and legal integrity is the key to Anglo-American legal theory and practice.

Tabla de contenidos provista por Syndetics

• 1 What Is Law?(p. 1)
• Why It Matters
• Disagreement about Law
• The Plain-Fact View
• A Threshold Objection
• The Real World
• Semantic Theories of Law
• The Real Argument for Semantic Theories
• 2 Interpretive Concepts(p. 45)
• The Semantic Sting
• An Imaginary Example
• A First Look at Interpretation
• Interpretation and Author's Intention
• Art and the Nature of Intention
• Intentions and Practices
• Stages of Interpretation
• Philosophers of Courtesy
• A Digression: Justice
• Skepticism about Interpretation
• 3 Jurisprudence Revisited(p. 87)
• A New Picture
• Concepts and Conceptions of Law
• Skeptical Conceptions and Wicked Law
• Grounds and Force of Law
• 4 Conventionalism(p. 114)
• Its Structure
• Its Appeal
• Legal Conventions
• Two Kinds of Conventionalism
• Does Conventionalism Fit Our Practice?
• Does Conventionalism Justify Our Practice?
• 5 Pragmatism and Personification(p. 151)
• A Skeptical Conception
• Does Pragmatism Fit?
• Law without Rights
• The Claims of Integrity
• Community Personified
• 6 Integrity(p. 176)
• Agenda
• Does Integrity Fit?
• Is Integrity Attractive?
• The Puzzle of Legitimacy
• Obligations of Community
• Fraternity and Political Community
• Untidy Endnotes
• 7 Integrity in Law(p. 225)
• A Large View
• The Chain of Law
• Law: The Question of Emotional Damages
• A Provisional Summary
• Some Familiar Objections
• Skepticism in Law
• 8 The Common Law(p. 276)
• The Economic Interpretation
• Complexities
• The Question of Justice
• The Utilitarian Duty
• The Egalitarian Interpretation
• Equality and Comparative Cost
• Private People and Public Bodies
• 9 Statutes(p. 313)
• Legislative Intention
• Speaker's Meaning Convictions
• Hercules' Method
• Legislative History
• Statutes over Time
• When Is the Language Clear?
• 10 The Constitution(p. 355)
• Is Constitutional Law Built on a Mistake?
• Liberals and Conservatives
• Historicism
• Passivism Hercules on Olympus
• Theories of Racial Equality
• Deciding Brown
• Deciding Bakke
• Is Hercules a Tyrant?
• 11 Law Beyond Law(p. 400)
• Law Works Itself Pure
• Law's Dreams
• Epilogue: What Is Law?
• Notes(p. 417)
• Index(p. 455)

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Library Journal Review

Dworkin (Jurisprudence, Oxford; and Law, NYU) sets out a theory of how judges determine what the law is and its application in hard cases where no set tled or clear rule of law disposes of a matter, testing his theory in common law cases turning on statutes and con stitutional cases. He posits that propo sitions of law are correctly established not because they represent a consensus or an efficient means to social goals, but because they answer the require ment that a political community act in a coherent, just, and principled manner toward all of its members. An exceed ingly complex work which echoes cer tain of his previous writings, this vol ume will be of primary interest to scholars with an intense disciplinary in terest. For subject collections. Merlin Whiteman, Dann Pecar Newman Ta lesnick & Kleiman, Indianapolis (c) Copyright 2010. Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.

Publishers Weekly Review

In this first full-length exposition of his theory of law, Dworkin, who teaches jurisprudence at Oxford University and New York University, maintains that society should ensure for all its members a legal system that functions in a coherent and principled manner. In prose accessible to the lay reader, he discusses at length several views of American constitutional law such as ``passivism'' and ``framers' intention.'' Rejecting both conventionalism and pragmatism, he advocates law as integrity which holds that propositions of law are true if they derive from justice, fairness and procedural due process in accordance with the community's legal practice. Citing examples, he further argues that law should be more than a collection of formal guidelines and that it should uphold more abstract moral principles, distinguishing between issues of policy and matters of principle affecting rights of the individual. Uniting jurisprudence with adjudication, Dworkin sees each judge as a link in a chain of law of which his or her judgment becomes a part. (May) (c) Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved

CHOICE Review

Dworkin here develops and refines the search for an explanatory theory of law that he began in Taking Rights Seriously (CH, Nov '77). Rejecting both the backward-looking view of law that simply applies past decisions to new cases and positivism with its instrumental use of judicial discretion, Dworkin concludes that the working conception of law, descriptively and normatively, is what he calls law as ``integrity.'' He means by this the necessity to search for and apply fundamental principles in deciding cases. Judges must find the basis for decision in a community's coherent conceptions of justice and fairness-an exercise in creative interpretation reflecting history, political theory, and morality which justifies the use of coercive power by the state. One may question Dworkin's extensive argumentation and exposition, but one cannot argue with his cogency and importance. His response to those who argue for constitutional interpretation only through original intent is especially persuasive, and his use of specific cases for illustrative purposes proves helpful. Not easy to read, but highly necessary for those concerned about American law. Well beyond the level of lower-level undergraduates, but a must for other academic and general libraries.-G.R. Urey, Susquehanna University