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This fascinating look at the National Security Council under the Reagan administration is well worth the price. Merges examines political in -fighting and the convolutions of Reagan foreign policy. Should be required reading for all students of foreign affairs and political science. Annotation(c) 2003 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)

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Publishers Weekly Review

The author served as special assistant to the president for national security affairs from 1983 to 1986. In this insider's account, he contends that Robert McFarlane and John Poindexter sought to circumvent the decision-making process of the National Security Council without President Reagan's knowledge. Resisting this, Menges made himself decidedly unpopular with both men. ``You are making too much trouble for us,'' Poindexter shouted at him; McFarlane called his objections ``subversive.'' Menges was equally disturbed by the State Department's attempts to replace Reagan-appointed ambassadors to Latin America with career foreign service officers who supported State's position, as well as by its efforts to bring about a political settlement contrary to the president's goals in Nicaragua. His attempts to inform Reagan of what was going on were blocked, and Menges maintains that he was given a phony promotion to prevent him from interfering in the Iran-Contra affair. Menges is ``virtually certain'' the president was kept in the dark in regard to the diversion of funds to the Contras. (September) (c) Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved

CHOICE Review

Menges was a key member of the National Security Council (NSC) staff for a time in the Reagan administration, and held other important posts as well. His book is a highly personalized and provocative account of foreign policy decision making in the Reagan years, with a particular focus on the NSC system, especially activities at the subcabinet level. Examining topics such as policy toward Central America, Angola, and counterterrorism, Menges details his perceptions and conclusions about policy-making during this period, with considerable emphasis on the bureaucratic infighting and intrigues he observed. Menges argues that the President was frequently ill served by his cabinet and staff. Naming names and describing specific episodes, he says that there was a subculture of manipulation and deception, a subculture that went far beyond the normal competition and differences in viewpoint that exist among different agencies and individuals. The State Department comes in for particularly heavy criticism. This book is unique among the plethora of books by ex-administration officials because of its particular focus. It is certain to be controversial and is suitable for a variety of readers, from faculty and graduate students through public library patrons. -R. L. Wendzel, United States Air War College