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In this book the author argues that moral principles are principles of rational choice. According to the usual view of choice, a rational person selects what is likely to give the greatest expectation of value or utility. But in many situations, if each person chooses in this way, everyone will be worse off than need be. Instead, Professor Gauthier proposes a principle whereby choice is made on an agreed basis of co-operation, rather than according to what would give the individual the greatest expectation of value. He shows that such a principle not only ensures mutual benefit and fairness, thus satisfying the standards of morality, but also that each person may actually expect greater utility by adhering to morality, even though the choice did not have that end primarily in view. In resolving what may appear to be a paradox, the author establishes morals on the firm foundation of reason.

Tabla de contenidos provista por Syndetics

• Morals By Agreement(p. i)
• Morals by Agreement(p. iii)
• Preface(p. v)
• Note to Reader(p. ix)
• I Overview of a Theory(p. 1)
• Ii Choice: Reason and Value(p. 21)
• Iii Strategy: Reason and Equilibrium(p. 60)
• Iv the Market: Freedom from Morality(p. 83)
• V Co-Operation: Bargaining and Justice(p. 113)
• Vi Compliance: Maximization Constrained(p. 157)
• Vii the Initial Bargaining Position: Rights and the Proviso(p. 190)
• Viii the Archimedean Point(p. 233)
• Ix Persons, Peoples, Generations(p. 268)
• X the Ring of Gyges(p. 306)
• Xi the Liberal Individual(p. 330)
• Index(p. 357)
• Preface(p. v)
• Note To Reader(p. ix)
• I Overview Of A Theory(p. 1)
• II Choice: Reason And Value(p. 21)
• III Strategy: Reason And Equilibrium(p. 60)
• IV The Market: Freedom From Morality(p. 83)
• V Co-Operation: Bargaining And Justice(p. 113)
• VI Compliance: Maximization Constrained(p. 157)
• VII The Initial Bargaining Position Rights And The Proviso(p. 190)
• VIII The Archimedean Point(p. 233)
• IX Persons, Peoples, Generations(p. 268)
• X The Ring Of Gyges(p. 306)
• XI The Liberal Individual(p. 330)
• Index(p. 357)

Reseñas proporcionadas por Syndetics

Library Journal Review

This carefully argued, lucid work defends a traditional conception of morality as a rational constraint on pursuing individual interest. Gauthier contends that rational cooperation is central to morality and he formulates a principle of agreement based upon a game-theoretic account of bargaining. Using the Prisoner's Dilemma, he argues for the rationality of complying with the principle from an initial noncoercive bargaining position in which one may better oneself provided that doing so does not worsen the condition of the person upon whom one acts. Gauthier concludes that commitment to rational cooperation not only assures fairness but also yields greater net utility than a policy of exclusive self-interest. Highly recommended for large philosophy collections. Robert Hoffman, Philosophy Dept., York Coll., CUNY (c) Copyright 2010. Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.

CHOICE Review

An elegant and important defense of a contractarian moral theory. Gauthier, the editor of Morality and Rational Self-Interest (CH, Apr '71), maintains that it is in general possible for a society to afford each person greater benefit than he or she could expect in a nonsocial or noncooperative environment and furthermore, that only a society such as this could command the willing allegiance of every rational individual. He explains why rational persons would agree ex ante to constraining principles, what general characteristics these principles must have as objects of rational agreement, and why rational persons would comply ex post with the agreed constraints. Gauthier claims that a just society is not linked to any substantive conception of what is good, either for the individual or for society. A just society is only concerned with enabling each person to realize the greatest amount of his or her good, on terms acceptable to all. Since each person can increase personal utility by cooperating, as utility maximizers each would find it rational to cooperate. Thus, by cooperating we make the most effective use of our powers to attain a richer way of life that would otherwise lie beyond our individual experience. An outstanding contribution to Hobbesian theory. Recommended for college and university collections.-M. Kohl, SUNY College at Fredonia

Notas de autor provistas por Syndetics

David Gauthier is at University of Pittsburgh.