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Thomas A. Russman argues forcefully that it is now possible to return in a new way to the once familiar ground of epistemological realism-the pre-Cartesian view that things themselves are knowable through perception and that such knowledge is foundational. This view has been rejected by most contemporary philosophers, who follow the path outlined convincingly by the likes of Wilfrid Sellers, Willard Quine, Thomas Kuhn, and Richard Rorty. Recognizing that any return to philosophical realism must deal with the criticisms raised by these prominent philosophers, Professor Russmanoffers his own incisive critique of a contemporary myth-what Karl Popper called "the myth of the framework," which replaced the earlier "myth of the given," as Wilfrid Sellars named it in his attack on realism. The battle between theses two myths is, according to Professor Russman, "a battle to the death." he believes that the observation framework is the abode of permanent truths about the world. He proceeds to explain why the current assumption to the contrary arose and why it is wrong. Then he shows how the "informal foundationalism" that he proposes can avoid the philosophical pitfalls of the earlier formal foundationalism in allowing for political toleration and artistic freedom: it works better than pragmatism as a general epistemology: and it supports a dynamic, nonreductive view of human nature. Thomas Russman earned an M.A. in Philosophy from The Catholic University of America and a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Princeton University. He teaches philosophy at the University of St. Thomas in Houston.

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CHOICE Review

This book defends a form of realism against major contemporary varieties of antirealism, a philosophical position that since Kant has received increasing advocacy. With a thorough grounding in the relevant literature and a good comprehension of the history of the controversy, Russman (University of St. Thomas) lucidly expounds the antirealist views of W. Sellars, W. Quine, H. Putnam, R. Rorty, T. Kuhn, and their pragmatist predecessors. He states his case against them in bold strokes, with disarming philosophical instincts. Russman bases his realism on what he calls informal foundationalism, the view that there is an observation framework in which reliable prethoretical perceptual knowledge can be expressed and shared. Furthermore, this framework is possible given its connection with preconceptual awareness of an already structured world, and that the autonomy of this framework makes it a stable reference point for changing theories. The author contends that informal foundationalism, being non-reductive and fallibilistic, can avoid the errors of ``formal foundationalism.'' The author also extends his critique of antirealism from the epistemic to both the ethical and aesthetic domains. A thought-provoking, instructive, and readable reference for enlightened general readers, undergraduates, and graduate students who wish to learn more about contemporary philosophy.-C.-T. Kim, Case Western Reserve University