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"Being and Time changed the course of philosophy." --Richard Rorty, New York Times Book Review

"Heidegger's masterwork." --The Economist

"What is the meaning of being?" This is the central question of Martin Heidegger's profoundly important work, in which the great philosopher seeks to explain the basic problems of existence. This first paperback edition of John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson's definitive translation also features a foreword by Heidegger scholar Taylor Carman.

A central influence on later philosophy, literature, art, and criticism--as well as existentialism and much of postmodern thought--Being and Time forever changed the intellectual map of the modern world. As Richard Rorty wrote in the New York Times Book Review, "You cannot read most of the important thinkers of recent times without taking Heidegger's thought into account."

Tabla de contenidos provista por Syndetics

• Foreword(p. xiii)
• Translators' Preface(p. xxiii)
• Author's Preface to the Seventh German Edition(p. xxvii)
• Introduction: Exposition of the Question of the Meaning of Being(p. 21)
• I The Necessity, Structure, and Priority of the Question of Being(p. 21)
• 1 The necessity for explicitly restating the question of Being(p. 21)
• 2 The formal structure of the question of Being(p. 24)
• 3 The ontological priority of the question of Being(p. 28)
• 4 The ontical priority of the question of Being(p. 32)
• II The Twofold Task in Working Out the Question of Being. Method and Design of our investigation(p. 36)
• 5 The ontological analytic of Dasein as laying bare the horizon for an Interpretation of the meaning of Being in general(p. 36)
• 6 The task of Destroying the history of ontology(p. 41)
• 7 The phenomenological method of investigation(p. 49)
• A The concept of phenomenon(p. 51)
• B The concept of the logos(p. 55)
• C The preliminary conception of phenomenology(p. 58)
• 8 Design of the treatise(p. 63)
• Part 1 The Interpretation of Dasein in Terms of Temporality, and the Explication of Time as the Transcendental Horizon for the Question of Being
• Division One: Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein
• I Exposition of the Task of a Preparatory Analysis of Dasein(p. 67)
• 9 The theme of the analytic of Dasein(p. 67)
• 10 How the analytic of Dasein is to be distinguished from anthropology, psychology, and biology(p. 71)
• 11 The existential analytic and the Interpretation of primitive Dasein. The difficulties of achieving a 'natural conception of the world'(p. 76)
• II Being-in-the-world in General as the basic state of Dasein(p. 78)
• 12 A preliminary sketch of Being-in-the-world, in terms of an orientation towards Being-in as such(p. 78)
• 13 A founded mode in which Being-in is exemplified. Knowing the world(p. 86)
• III The Worldhood of the World(p. 91)
• 14 The idea of the worldhood of the world in general(p. 91)
• A Analysis of environmentality and worldhood in general(p. 95)
• 15 The Being of the entities encountered in the environment(p. 95)
• 16 How the worldly character of the environment announces itself in entities within-the-world(p. 102)
• 17 Reference and signs(p. 107)
• 18 Involvement and significance: the worldhood of the world(p. 114)
• B A contrast between our analysis of worldhood and Descartes' Interpretation of the world(p. 122)
• 19 The definition of the 'world' as res extensa(p. 123)
• 20 Foundations of the ontological definition of the 'world'(p. 125)
• 21 Hermeneutical discussion of the Cartesian ontology of the 'world'(p. 128)
• C The aroundness of the environment, and Dasein's spatiality(p. 134)
• 22 The spatiality of the ready-to-hand within-the-world(p. 135)
• 23 The spatiality of Being-in-the-world(p. 138)
• 24 Space, and Dasein's spatiality(p. 145)
• IV Being-in-the-world as Being-with and Being-one's-self. The 'They'(p. 149)
• 25 An approach to the existential question of the "who" of Dasein(p. 150)
• 26 The Dasein-with of Others, and everyday Being-with(p. 153)
• 27 Everyday Being-one's-Self and the "they"(p. 163)
• V Being-in as such
• 28 The task of a thematic analysis of Being-in(p. 169)
• A The existential Constitution of the "there"(p. 172)
• 29 Being-there as state-of-mind(p. 172)
• 30 Fear as a mode of state-of-mind(p. 179)
• 31 Being-there as understanding(p. 182)
• 32 Understanding and interpretation(p. 188)
• 33 Assertion as a derivative mode of interpretation(p. 195)
• 34 Being-there and discourse. Language(p. 203)
• B The everyday Being of the "there", and the falling of Dasein(p. 210)
• 35 Idle talk(p. 211)
• 36 Curiosity(p. 214)
• 37 Ambiguity(p. 217)
• 38 Falling and thrownness(p. 219)
• VI Care as the Being of Dasein(p. 225)
• 39 The question of the primordial totality of Dasein's structural whole(p. 225)
• 40 The basic state-of-mind of anxiety as a distinctive way in which Dasein is disclosed(p. 228)
• 41 Dasein's Being as care(p. 235)
• 42 Confirmation of the existential Interpretation of Dasein as care in terms of Dasein's pre-ontological way of interpreting itself(p. 241)
• 43 Dasein, worldhood, and reality(p. 244)
• (a) Reality as a problem of Being, and whether the 'external world' can be proved(p. 246)
• (b) Reality as an ontological problem(p. 252)
• (c) Reality and care(p. 254)
• 44 Dasein, disclosedness, and truth(p. 256)
• (a) The traditional conception of truth, and its ontological foundations(p. 257)
• (b) The primordial phenomenon of truth and the derivative character of the traditional conception of truth(p. 262)
• (c) The kind of Being which truth possesses, and the presupposition of truth(p. 269)
• Division Two: Dasein and Temporality
• 45 The outcome of the preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein, and the task of a primordial existential Interpretation of this entity(p. 274)
• I Dasein's Possibility of Being-a-whole, and Being-towards-death(p. 279)
• 46 The seeming impossibility of getting Dasein's Being-a-whole into our grasp ontologically and determining its character(p. 279)
• 47 The possibility of experiencing the death of Others, and the possibility of getting a whole Dasein into our grasp(p. 281)
• 48 That which is still outstanding; the end; totality(p. 285)
• 49 How the existential analysis of death is distinguished from other possible Interpretations of this phenomenon(p. 290)
• 50 Preliminary sketch of the existential-ontological structure of death(p. 293)
• 51 Being-towards-death and the everydayness of Dasein(p. 296)
• 52 Everyday Being-towards-the-end, and the full existential conception of death(p. 299)
• 53 Existential projection of an authentic Being-towards-death(p. 304)
• II Dasein's Attestation of an Authentic Potentiality-for-being, and Resoluteness(p. 312)
• 54 The problem of how an authentic existentiell possibility is attested(p. 312)
• 55 The existential-ontological foundations of conscience(p. 315)
• 56 The character of conscience as a call(p. 315)
• 57 Conscience as the call of care(p. 319)
• 58 Understanding the appeal, and guilt(p. 325)
• 59 The existential Interpretation of the conscience, and the way conscience is ordinarily interpreted(p. 335)
• 60 The existential structure of the authentic potentiality-for-Being which is attested in the conscience(p. 341)
• III Dasein's Authentic Potentiality-for-being-a-whole, and Temporality as the Ontological Meaning of Care(p. 349)
• 61 A preliminary sketch of the methodological step from the definition of Dasein's authentic Being-a-whole to the laying-bare of temporality as a phenomenon(p. 349)
• 62 Anticipatory resoluteness as the way in which Dasein's potentiality-for-Being-a-whole has existentiell authenticity(p. 352)
• 63 The hermeneutical situation at which we have arrived for Interpreting the meaning of the Being of care; and the methodological character of the existential analytic in general(p. 358)
• 64 Care and selfhood(p. 364)
• 65 Temporality as the ontological meaning of care(p. 370)
• 66 Dasein's temporality and the tasks arising there-from of repeating the existential analysis in a more primordial manner(p. 380)
• IV Temporality and Everydayness(p. 383)
• 67 The basic content of Dasein's existential constitution, and a preliminary sketch of the temporal Interpretation of it(p. 383)
• 68 The temporality of disclosedness in general(p. 384)
• (a) The temporality of understanding(p. 385)
• (b) The temporality of state-of-mind(p. 389)
• (c) The temporality of falling(p. 396)
• (d) The temporality of discourse(p. 400)
• 69 The temporality of Being-in-the-world and the problem of the transcendence of the world(p. 401)
• (a) The temporality of circumspective concern(p. 403)
• (b) The temporal meaning of the way in which circumspective concern becomes modified into the theoretical discovery of the present-at-hand within-the-world(p. 408)
• (c) The temporal problem of the transcendence of the world(p. 415)
• 70 The temporality of the spatiality that is characteristic of Dasein(p. 418)
• 71 The temporal meaning of Dasein's everydayness(p. 421)
• V Temporality and Historicality(p. 424)
• 72 Existential-ontological exposition of the problem of history(p. 424)
• 73 The ordinary understanding of history, and Dasein's historizing(p. 429)
• 74 The basic constitution of historicality(p. 434)
• 75 Dasein's historicality, and world-history(p. 439)
• 76 The existential source of historiology in Dasein's historicality(p. 444)
• 77 The connection of the foregoing exposition of the problem of historicality with the researches of Wilhelm Dilthey and the ideas of Count Yorck(p. 449)
• VI Temporality and Within-time-ness as the source of the ordinary conception of time(p. 456)
• 78 The incompleteness of the foregoing temporal analysis of Dasein(p. 456)
• 79 Dasein's temporality, and our concern with time(p. 458)
• 80 The time with which we concern ourselves, and within-time-ness(p. 464)
• 81 Within-time-ness and the genesis of the ordinary conception of time(p. 472)
• 82 A comparison of the existential-ontological connection of temporality, Dasein, and world-time, with Hegel's way of taking the relation between time and spirit(p. 480)
• (a) Hegel's conception of time(p. 480)
• (b) Hegel's Interpretation of the connection between time and spirit(p. 484)
• 83 The existential-temporal analytic of Dasein, and the question of fundamental ontology as to the meaning of Being in general(p. 486)
• Author's Notes(p. 489)
• Glossary of German Terms(p. 503)
• Index(p. 524)

Extracto provisto por Syndetics

Being and Time Chapter One Exposition of the Task of a Preparatory Analysis of Dasein The Theme of the Analytic of Dasein We are ourselves the entities to be analysed. The Being of any such entity is in each case mine. These entities, in their Being, comport themselves towards their Being. As entities with such Being, they are delivered over to their own Being. Being is that which is an issue for every such entity. This way of characterizing Dasein has a double consequence: I. The 'essence' ["Wesen"] of this entity lies in its "to be" [Zu-sein]. Its Being-what-it-is [Was-sein] (essentia) must, so far as we can speak of it at all, be conceived in terms of its Being (existentia). But here our ontological task is to show that when we choose to designate the Being of this entity as "existence" [Existenz], this term does not and cannot have the ontological signification of the traditional term "existentia"; ontologically, existentia is tantamount to Being-present-at-hand, a kind of Being which is essentially inappropriate to entities of Dasein's character. To avoid getting bewildered, we shall always use the Interpretative expression "presence-at-hand" for the term "existentia", while the term "existence", as a designation of Being, will be allotted solely to Dasein. The 'essence' of Dasein lies in its existence. Accordingly those characteristics which can be exhibited in this entity are not 'properties' present-at-hand of some entity which 'looks' so and so and is itself present-at-hand; they are in each case possible ways for it to be, and no more than that. All the Being-as-it-is [So-sein] which this entity possesses is primarily Being. So when we designate this entity with the term 'Dasein', we are expressing not its "what" (as if it were a table, house or tree) but its Being. 2. That Being which is an issue for this entity in its very Being, is in each case mine. Thus Dasein is never to be taken ontologically as an instance or special case of some genus of entities as things that are present-at-hand. To entities such as these, their Being is 'a matter of indifference'; or more precisely, they 'are' such that their Being can be neither a matter of indifference to them, nor the opposite. Because Dasein has in each case mineness [Femeinigkeit], one must always use a personal pronoun when one addresses it: 'I am', 'you are'. Furthermore, in each case Dasein is mine to be in one way or another. Dasein has always made some sort of decision as to the way in which it is in each case mine [je meines]. That entity which in its Being has this very Being as an issue, comports itself towards its Being as its ownmost possibility. In each case Dasein is its possibility, and it 'has' this possibility, but not just as a property [eigenschaftlich], as something present-at-hand would. And because Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility, it can, in its very Being, 'choose' itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself; or only 'seem' to do so. But only in so far as it is essentially something which can be authentic -- that is, something of its own -- can it have lost itself and not yet won itself. As modes of Being, authenticity and inauthenticity (these expressions have been chosen terminologically in a strict sense) are both grounded in the fact that any Dasein whatsoever is characterized by mineness. But the inauthenticity of Dasein does not signify any 'less' Being or any 'lower' degree of Being. Rather it is the case that even in its fullest concretion Dasein can be characterized by inauthenticity -- when busy, when excited, when interested, when ready for enjoyment. The two characteristics of Dasein which we have sketched -- the priority of 'existentia' over essentia, and the fact that Dasein is in each case mine [die Jemeinigkeit] -- have already indicated that in the analytic of this entity we are facing a peculiar phenomenal domain. Dasein does not have the kind of Being which belongs to something merely present-at-hand within the world, nor does it ever have it. So neither is it to be presented thematically as something we come across in the same way as we come across what is present-at-hand. The right way of presenting it is so far from self-evident that to determine what form it shall take is itself an essential part of the ontological analytic of this entity. Only by presenting this entity in the right way can we have any understanding of its Being. No matter how provisional our analysis may be, it always requires the assurance that we have started correctly. In determining itself as an entity, Dasein always does so in the light of a possibility which it is itself and which, in its very Being, it somehow understands. This is the formal meaning of Dasein's existential constitution. But this tells us that if we are to Interpret this entity ontologically, the problematic of its Being must be developed from the existentiality of its existence. This cannot mean, however, that "Dasein" is to be construed in terms of some concrete possible idea of existence. At the outset of our analysis it is particularly important that Dasein should not be Interpreted with the differentiated character [Differenz] of some definite way of existing, but that it should be uncovered [aufgedeckt] in the undifferentiated character which it has proximally and for the most part. This undifferentiated character of Dasein's everydayness is not nothing, but a positive phenomenal characteristic of this entity. Out of this kind of Being -- and back into it again -- is all existing, such as it is. We call this everyday undifferentiated character of Dasein "averageness" [Durchschnittlichkeit]. And because this average everydayness makes up what is ontically proximal for this entity, it has again and again been passed over in... Being and Time . Copyright © by Martin Heidegger. Reprinted by permission of HarperCollins Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved. Available now wherever books are sold. Excerpted from Being and Time by Martin Heidegger All rights reserved by the original copyright owners. Excerpts are provided for display purposes only and may not be reproduced, reprinted or distributed without the written permission of the publisher.

Notas de autor provistas por Syndetics

Martin Heidegger was born in Messkirch, Baden, Germany on September 22, 1889. He studied Roman Catholic theology and philosophy at the University of Frieburg before joining the faculty at Frieburg as a teacher in 1915. Eight years later Heidegger took a teaching position at Marburg. He taught there until 1928 and then went back to Frieburg as a professor of philosophy.

As a philosopher, Heidegger developed existential phenomenology. He is still widely regarded as one of the most original philosophers of the 20th century. Influenced by other philosophers of his time, Heidegger wrote the book, Being in Time, in 1927. In this work, which is considered one of the most important philosophical works of our time, Heidegger asks and answers the question "What is it, to be?" Other books written by Heidegger include Basic Writings, a collection of Heidegger's most popular writings; Nietzsche, an inquiry into the central issues of Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy; On the Way to Language, Heidegger's central ideas on the origin, nature and significance of language; and What is Called Thinking, a systematic presentation of Heidegger's later philosophy.

Since the 1960s, Heidegger's influence has spread beyond continental Europe and into a number of English-speaking countries. Heidegger died in Messkirch on May 26, 1976.

(Bowker Author Biography)