The failure of corporate law fundamental flaws & progressive possibilities Kent Greenfield.
Detalles de publicación: Chicago University of Chicago Press c2006.Descripción: xi, 288 p. 24 cmISBN:- 9780226306933 (cloth : alk. paper)
- 0226306933 (cloth : alk. paper)
- KF 1416 .G74 2006
| Imagen de cubierta | Tipo de ítem | Biblioteca actual | Biblioteca de origen | Colección | Ubicación en estantería | Signatura topográfica | Materiales especificados | Info Vol | URL | Copia número | Estado | Notas | Fecha de vencimiento | Código de barras | Reserva de ítems | Prioridad de la cola de reserva de ejemplar | Reservas para cursos | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Libro | Biblioteca de Derecho Mons. Fremiot Torres Oliver Colección General biblioteca derecho | KF 1416 .G74 2006 (Navegar estantería(Abre debajo)) | Disponible | 70000000882330 |
Descripciones mejoradas de Syndetics:
When used in conjunction with corporations, the term "public" is misleading. Anyone can purchase shares of stock, but public corporations themselves are uninhibited by a sense of societal obligation or strict public oversight. In fact, managers of most large firms are prohibited by law from taking into account the interests of the public in decision making, if doing so hurts shareholders. But this has not always been the case, as until the beginning of the twentieth century, public corporations were deemed to have important civic responsibilities.
With The Failure of Corporate Law, Kent Greenfield hopes to return corporate law to a system in which the public has a greater say in how firms are governed. Greenfield maintains that the laws controlling firms should be much more protective of the public interest and of the corporation's various stakeholders, such as employees. Only when the law of corporations is evaluated as a branch of public law--as with constitutional law or environmental law--will it be clear what types of changes can be made in corporate governance to improve the common good. Greenfield proposes changes in corporate governance that would enable corporations to meet the progressive goal of creating wealth for society as a whole rather than merely for shareholders and executives.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
September 11 and corporate law -- Corporate law as public law -- Workers, shareholders, and the purpose of corporations -- Corporations and the duty to obey the law -- Democracy and the dominance of Delaware -- New principles, new policies -- Corporate governance as a public policy tool -- Workers and corporate fraud -- Irrationality and the business judgment rule.
Tabla de contenidos provista por Syndetics
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction Part One
- Fundamental Flaws
- 1 September 11 and Corporate Law
- 2 Corporate Law as Public Law
- 3 Workers, Shareholders, and the Purpose of Corporations
- 4 Corporations and the Duty to Obey the Law
- 5 Democracy and the Dominance of Delaware Part Two - Progressive Possibilities
- 6 New Principles, New Policies
- 7 Corporate Governance as a Public Policy Tool
- 8 Workers and Corporate Fraud
- 9 Irrationality and the Business Judgment Rule Postscript: Getting Real about New Possibilities
- Notes
- Index"
Notas de autor provistas por Syndetics
Kent Greenfield is professor of law at Boston College Law School and served as a law clerk under Supreme Court Justice David H. Souter.