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This cogent and knowledgeable critique of the tradition of modern analytic philosophy focuses on the work of its central figures--Russell, Carnap, and Quine--and finds it wanting. In its place, Hao Wang unfolds his own original view of what philosophy could and should be. The base of any serious philosophy, he contends, should take as its point of departure the actual state of human knowledge. He explains the relation of this new tradition to mathematical logic and reveals the crucial transitions and mistakes in mainstream Anglo-American philosophy that make a new approach so compelling. Equally at home in philosophy and mathematics, Wang is uniquely qualified to take on the task of critically examining modern philosophy. He carefully traces the path of ideas from Russell and Wittgenstein through the Vienna Circle to modern British and American philosophy, and makes use of his familiarity with the profound thought of Kurt Godel with whom he has had numerous discussions. He also presents the broader significance of Russell's philosophy, provides a comprehensive and unified treatment of Quine's work in logic and in philosophy, and delineates what is common between Carnap and Quine.

Tabla de contenidos provista por Syndetics

• Preface(p. ix)
• Introduction(p. 1)
• 1 Russell and philosophy in this century(p. 45)
• 2 A digression on Wittgenstein's philosophy(p. 75)
• 3 From Vienna 1925 to America 1984(p. 101)
• 4 Quine's logical negativism(p. 153)
• 5 Metaphilosophical observations(p. 191)
• References(p. 215)
• Chronological table(p. 231)
• Index(p. 261)

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CHOICE Review

Conceived along the lines of logical empiricism, analytic philosophy has often been attacked by defenders of traditional metaphysics and philosophical theology. Wang (Rockefeller University) shares the widely held view that analytic philosophy (so conceived) is artificially restrictive to the philosophical enterprise, and he locates its chief weakness in an area where it has generally been deemed to be most successful: logic and the philosophy of mathematics. He argues that the critical shortcoming of analytic philosophy is its inability to give an adequate account of mathematics, and that the reason for this is its commitment to empiricism. Wang examines and criticizes four leading philosophers in the development of an analytic account of mathematics: B. Russell, the early L. Wittgenstein, R. Carnap, and W. Quine. The section on Quine, whom he characterizes as a ``logical negativist,'' will be of special interest. Wang concludes by defending the traditional conception of philosophy as the search for a comprehensive, unified worldview. This is Wang's second major critique of analytic philosophy; his first critique was From Mathematics to Philosophy (1974), Beyond Analytic Philosophy is first of a projected three-volume series designed to articulate his own worldview. Includes references and a lengthy chronological table. Appropriate for upper-division undergraduates and graduate students in philosophy.-S. Andre, California State University, Long Beach