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In the first comprehensive study of election law since the Supreme Court decided Bush v. Gore, Richard L. Hasen rethinks the Court's role in regulating elections. Drawing on the case files of the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist courts, Hasen roots the Court's intervention in political process cases to the landmark 1962 case, Baker v. Carr. The case opened the courts to a variety of election law disputes, to the point that the courts now control and direct major aspects of the American electoral process.
The Supreme Court does have a crucial role to play in protecting a socially constructed "core" of political equality principles, contends Hasen, but it should leave contested questions of political equality to the political process itself. Under this standard, many of the Court's most important election law cases from Baker to Bush have been wrongly decided.

Tabla de contenidos provista por Syndetics

• Preface(p. ix)
• Acknowledgments(p. xi)
• Introduction: Mighty Platonic Guardians(p. 1)
• 1 The Supreme Court of Political Equality(p. 14)
• 2 Judicial Unmanageability and Political Equality(p. 47)
• 3 Protecting the Core of Political Equality(p. 73)
• 4 Deferring to Political Branches on Contested Equality Claims(p. 101)
• 5 Equality, Not Structure(p. 138)
• Conclusion: Political Equality and a Minimalist Court(p. 157)
• Appendix 1 Twentieth-Century Election Law Cases Decided by the Supreme Court in a Written Opinion(p. 166)
• Appendix 2 Justice Goldberg's Proposed Dissent to a Per Curiam Summary Affirmance in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections(p. 176)
• Notes(p. 189)
• Index(p. 221)
• About the Author(p. 227)

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CHOICE Review

Unlike many of the other works analyzing election law and its problems in the wake of Bush v. Gore, Hasen (law, Loyola Univ.) has set out an especially ambitious goal for himself. Specifically, he seeks to justify a broader view of how courts should decide election law cases in general. In a nutshell, Hasen's argument posits that courts should act firmly when they are judging so-called "core political rights" (political equality rights that are a product of social consensus), while stepping more gingerly and providing only vague pronouncements when judging "contested rights" (rights that lack such consensus). To support his argument, Hasen analyzes numerous Supreme Court cases from Baker v. Carr (1962) through the present. Naturally, his argument invites just as many questions as it answers (How does one define a social consensus? Hasn't the court traditionally played a role in shifting consensus?, etc.). Still, Hasen's effort earns a place on the shelf alongside the works of Ackerman, Posner, and others who have been dutifully trying to make sense of this jurisprudence ever since the Florida 2000 fiasco. ^BSumming Up: Recommended. Primarily graduate students and law faculty; accessible to some undergraduates. D. Yalof University of Connecticut

Notas de autor provistas por Syndetics

Richard L. Hasen is Professor of Law and William M. Rains Fellow at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.