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This comprehensive and established book - first published in German - explains the new approach of law and economics to civil law. Written by two of Europe's leading scholars in the field, it provides a thorough yet accessible economic analysis of tort law, contract law and property law, with particular emphasis placed on legal cases and doctrines from civil law.

The authors first review the basic concepts of both normative and positive economics and their links to institutional economics. They move on to develop the economic rationales of tort law and examine the different concepts involved. They also investigate contracts, especially sales contracts, quasi contracts, and pre-contractual duties which play a prominent role in civil law countries. Finally, they provide a comprehensive overview of the economic functions and legal forms of property law. Throughout, the authors analyse and evaluate the complexities of civil law using economic theory, and clearly demonstrate that the legal forms found in civil law frequently serve the purpose of increasing a nation's wealth.

This outstanding volume is the first law and economics textbook that concentrates on civil law. It integrates legal doctrines with economic reasoning, and lucidly explains the concepts involved. It requires no prior knowledge of either economics or law and will undoubtedly become the requisite textbook in the field for all students of law, law and economics and business administration. It will also be of great value to academics and practitioners interested in an overview of this area.

Tabla de contenidos provista por Syndetics

• Preface(p. xi)
• Part I Fundementals
• 1. What is the Economic Analysis of Law?(p. 3)
• 1.1 Scarcity and Waste(p. 3)
• 1.2 Consequentialism(p. 4)
• 1.3 Individualism(p. 5)
• 1.4 New Institutionalism(p. 6)
• 1.5 Neoclassical Microeconomics(p. 7)
• 1.6 Efficiency(p. 8)
• 1.7 Distributive Justice(p. 8)
• 1.8 Alternatives to Efficiency(p. 9)
• 1.9 The Task of the Economic Analysis of Law(p. 11)
• 2. Decisions, Consequences and Evaluation(p. 14)
• 2.1 Means and Ends(p. 14)
• 2.2 Consequentialism and Judge-made Law(p. 15)
• 2.3 Explanation, Prognosis and Evaluation(p. 16)
• 2.4 Evaluation of Judicial Decisions(p. 18)
• 3. Social Welfare(p. 20)
• 3.1 Social Choice Theory(p. 20)
• 3.2 Unanimity(p. 21)
• 3.3 The Pareto Principle(p. 21)
• 3.4 Pareto Efficiency(p. 23)
• 3.5 Legal Policy(p. 28)
• 3.6 The Kaldor-Hicks Criterion(p. 28)
• 3.7 Efficiency, Utilitarianism and Other Moral Theories(p. 35)
• 3.8 Criticisms of Utilitarianism and Social Welfare Functions(p. 37)
• 3.9 Social Welfare Functions and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem(p. 38)
• 3.10 Categorical Decisions(p. 41)
• 3.11 Subjectivism(p. 45)
• 3.12 The Practicability of Welfare-based Rules(p. 46)
• 4. Rationality and Economic Behaviour(p. 50)
• 4.1 What is Economics?(p. 50)
• 4.2 Homo Oeconomicus(p. 51)
• 5. The Market, Property Rights and the Law(p. 66)
• 5.1 The Theory of Demand(p. 66)
• 5.2 The Theory of Supply(p. 74)
• 5.3 Equilibrium Under Perfect Competition and Monopoly(p. 78)
• 5.4 Property Rights(p. 83)
• 5.5 Transaction Costs, Property Rights and the Coase Theorem(p. 86)
• 5.6 Market Failures: Changing in the Legal System(p. 96)
• 5.7 The Evolution of Legal Norms(p. 99)
• Part II Civil Liability
• 6. The Aims and Problems of Civil Liability(p. 107)
• 6.1 Introduction(p. 107)
• 6.2 The Substance of Civil Liability(p. 109)
• 6.3 The Aim of Primary Cost Avoidance: the Properties of Optimal Prevention(p. 113)
• 6.4 Avoiding Secondary Costs (Risk Spreading)(p. 117)
• 6.5 Avoiding Tertiary Costs(p. 122)
• 6.6 Tradeoffs(p. 122)
• 6.7 Attribution of Damage(p. 123)
• 6.8 Legal Problems of Attributing Responsibility(p. 125)
• 7. Negligence and Strict Liability in German Law(p. 134)
• 7.1 Introductory Remarks(p. 134)
• 7.2 The Consequentialist View of Negligence(p. 134)
• 7.3 The Learned Hand Formula(p. 135)
• 7.4 Negligence from a Legal Point of View(p. 136)
• 7.5 The Effects of a Negligence Rule(p. 143)
• 7.6 The Effects of Negligence under Partial Liability(p. 147)
• 7.7 Negligence and Dangerous Activities(p. 148)
• 7.8 Negligence in the German Courts(p. 150)
• 7.9 A Second Interpretation of Negligence(p. 154)
• 7.10 Pragmatic Principles and the Learned Hand Formula(p. 157)
• 7.11 The Burden of Proof for Negligence(p. 160)
• 7.12 The Relevance of Norms and Conventions(p. 162)
• 7.13 Strict Liability(p. 163)
• 7.14 The Effects of Strict Liability(p. 166)
• 7.15 The Cost and Organizational Implications of Strict Liability(p. 169)
• 7.16 Liability Caps under Strict Liability(p. 170)
• 7.17 Strict Liability and Unforeseeable Damages(p. 171)
• 7.18 Liability and Insurance(p. 172)
• 8. Liability under Bilateral Damages(p. 177)
• 8.1 The Reciprocal Nature of Damages(p. 177)
• 8.2 The Legal Regulation of Bilateral Damages in German Civil Law(p. 178)
• 8.3 The Cheapest Cost Avoider(p. 179)
• 8.4 Efficient Precaution under Bilateral Damages and a Constant Level of Activity(p. 184)
• 8.5 Negligence and Bilateral Liability(p. 187)
• 8.6 Strict Liability and Bilateral Damages(p. 189)
• 8.7 Socially Detrimental Behaviour under Bilateral Liability(p. 190)
• 8.8 Recovery of Avoidance Costs(p. 193)
• 8.9 The Problem of Opportunism(p. 197)
• 9. Causality and the Attribution of Damages(p. 200)
• 9.1 The Problem in Context(p. 200)
• 9.2 The Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Liability in German Law(p. 201)
• 9.3 The Problem of Probabilistic Causality(p. 207)
• 9.4 The Limits of Probabalistic Causality(p. 218)
• 10. Special Problems in Civil Liability(p. 221)
• 10.1 Product Liability(p. 221)
• 10.2 Environmental Liability(p. 240)
• 10.3 Compensation for Pain and Suffering(p. 245)
• 10.4 Vicarious and Employer Liability(p. 250)
• 10.5 Pure Financial Loss(p. 253)
• 10.6 Immaterial Losses(p. 259)
• 10.7 The Limits to Civil Liability and the Transition to Public Law(p. 261)
• Part III Contract Law
• 11. Freedom of Contract, Contract Law and the Fully Specified Contract(p. 273)
• 11.1 Freedom of Contract(p. 273)
• 11.2 The Economic Function of Contract Law(p. 277)
• 11.3 The Fully Specified Contract(p. 278)
• 11.4 A Note on the Harmonization of European Contract Law(p. 293)
• 12. Freedom of Contract and Market Mimicking Rules(p. 296)
• 12.1 Contractual Sovereignty and Allocative Efficiency(p. 296)
• 12.2 The Economic and Legal Model(p. 297)
• 12.3 Reconstructing the Fully Specified Contract by Contract Law (Default Rules)(p. 299)
• 12.4 Interpreting Contractual Terms(p. 301)
• 12.5 The Doctrine of the Inherent Basis of Contract(p. 303)
• 12.6 The Legal Relevance of the Fully Specified Contract(p. 306)
• 12.7 Case Studies(p. 308)
• 13. Contractual Breach, Impossibility and Delay(p. 320)
• 13.1 The Legal Consequences of Disruption of Contracts(p. 320)
• 13.2 Legal Remedies for Breach and Delay(p. 321)
• 13.3 The Heuristics of Rules for a Breach of Contract(p. 323)
• 13.4 Assessing German Rules(p. 325)
• 13.5 The Subjectivist Critique of the Doctrine of Efficient Breach(p. 329)
• 13.6 Compensatory Damages and Foreseeable Losses(p. 332)
• 14. Warranty Contracts(p. 336)
• 14.1 Legal Redress(p. 336)
• 14.2 The Basic Problems of Warranties(p. 337)
• 14.3 Warranty as an Insurance Policy(p. 338)
• 14.4 Warranty Law as an Incentive for Product Quality(p. 339)
• 14.5 Warranty as a Quality Signal(p. 340)
• 14.6 Limited Warranty(p. 341)
• 14.7 Cost Comparisons of Alternative Rules(p. 343)
• 14.8 Compensatory Damages for Defective Wares(p. 344)
• 14.9 Statutory versus Contractual Warranty(p. 346)
• 14.10 Proposals for an Efficient Statutory Warranty Law(p. 349)
• 14.11 Contractual Remedies and Risk Behaviour(p. 353)
• 15. Ignorance, Trust, Opportunism and Efficiency(p. 355)
• 15.1 The Problem of Trust(p. 355)
• 15.2 Productive and Unproductive Information(p. 356)
• 15.3 Information Costs under Price and Quality Uncertainty(p. 358)
• 15.4 Adverse Effects under Information Deficits(p. 360)
• 15.5 Overcoming Information Deficits with Social Institutions(p. 364)
• 15.6 The Danger of Opportunism(p. 368)
• 15.7 Consumer Protection: Standard-form Contracts and the 'Market for Lemons'(p. 370)
• 16. The Protection of Good Faith(p. 375)
• 16.1 The Problem of the Protection of Good Faith(p. 375)
• 16.2 The Economic and Legal Meaning of the Principle of Good Faith(p. 381)
• 16.3 Liability for Breach of Good Faith(p. 382)
• 16.4 The Practical Importance of the Economic Approach to the Protection of Good Faith(p. 385)
• 16.5 Price and Quality Uncertainty(p. 386)
• 16.6 Legal and Economic Problems of Professional Expertise(p. 394)
• Part IV Property Rights
• 17. Basic Issues in Property Rights(p. 401)
• 17.1 Concepts(p. 401)
• 17.2 Efficiency and the Misspecification of Property Rights(p. 404)
• 17.3 Property Rights and Scarcity(p. 409)
• 17.4 Transferability of Property Rights(p. 412)
• 18. The Involuntary Transfer of Property Rights(p. 418)
• 18.1 Bona Fide Transfer(p. 418)
• 18.2 Regulatory Takings(p. 421)
• 18.3 The Transfer of Property Rights and Creditor Conflicts(p. 431)
• 19. The Inefficient Use of Real Estate(p. 440)
• 19.1 The Nature of the Problem(p. 440)
• 19.2 The Sole-owner Principle(p. 440)
• 19.3 Second-best Solutions under Incomplete Information(p. 441)
• 19.4 An Example from German Law(p. 442)
• 19.5 The Limits to Regulation by Civil Law(p. 447)
• 20. Intellectual Property Law and Innovation(p. 449)
• 20.1 Competition in Goods and Ideas(p. 449)
• 20.2 Intellectual Property Rights(p. 450)
• 20.3 The Priority Principle(p. 451)
• 20.4 The Effect of Risk(p. 452)
• 20.5 Patent Enforcement and its Effect on R&D(p. 453)
• 20.6 The Effects of Licensing Contracts(p. 454)
• 20.7 Compulsory Licences(p. 455)
• 20.8 The Extent of Patent Protection(p. 455)
• 20.9 State Support for Innovation(p. 456)
• 20.10 Copyright and Copying Laws(p. 457)
• Index(p. 461)

Notas de autor provistas por Syndetics

Claus Ott is Professor of Civil Law and former Director of the Institute of Law and Economics and the ERASMUS Programme in Law and Economics at the University of Hamburg.