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This book is a comprehensive analysis of the relevance of international law to the conduct of international relations and foreign policy. Written by a distinguished international lawyer and academic with over 35 years of experience, this book contains a systematic treatment of both fields of study. This work serves as an introduction to contemporary theories of international relations and as a primer on international law especially for the non-lawyer. Focusing on contemporary problems of terrorism, nuclear non-proliferation, war and peace, economic development, protection of the global environment, reform of the United Nations, democracy and protection of human rights, this work develops the thesis that international law is a neglected tool of foreign policy that can be used to address many of today's difficult and unresolved problems. It concludes by advocating a 'new global order' in the form of the rule of law and multilateral solidarity in addressing world problems.

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• Preface and overview
• 1 Introduction: two very different wars in Iraq
• 2 The twenty-first century: the end of history or a new beginning?
• 3 International power politics
• 4 A new global order based on international law and multilateralism
• 5 Peace and security: reinventing the United Nations
• 6 International political economy
• 7 International environmental protection
• 8 International human rights
• 9 International crimes
• 10 Conclusions

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CHOICE Review

Roehrig (Cardinal Stritch Univ.) draws on classics of deterrence from Kaufmann (1954) and George and Smoke (1974) to produce a detailed, specialized updating of his dissertation on the extended deterrence protection of South Korea against the North, provided by the US, enshrined in the 1954 treaty, and pursued with great continuity over many administrations. The author argues that it worked well in the past, but George W. Bush has shifted to a "compellence strategy" to get North Korea to stop its nuclear program. That strategy is not working. Roehrig sees North Korea as basically not irrational. The North Koreans fear US air power, yet flaunt US proliferation concerns to magnify their own international importance. Pyongyang has so far not been satisfied with vague US offers of benefits in exchange for compliance. One finds no new theory here but many interesting details, mostly from official US sources and statements, the latest from 2004. The work implicitly raises several questions. Has compellence ever worked? Was Waltz right that mutual deterrence can be stable? Although Roehrig does not include the current crisis and lack of South Korean enthusiasm, the work is valuable background for those now making policy. ^BSumming Up: Recommended. Graduate students, researchers, faculty, and practitioners. M. G. Roskin Lycoming College

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Thomas J. Schoenbaum is Dean and Virginia Rusk Professor at the University of Georgia.

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