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Model jury instructions in civil antitrust cases.

Colaborador(es): Idioma: Español Detalles de publicación: Chicago, Ill. ABA Section of Antitrust Law 2005.Edición: 2005 edDescripción: 1 v. (various pagings) 23 cmISBN:
  • 1590315243 (pbk.)
  • 9781590315248 (pbk.)
Tema(s): Clasificación LoC:
  • KF 9066 .A5 M63 2005
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Imagen de cubierta Tipo de ítem Biblioteca actual Biblioteca de origen Colección Ubicación en estantería Signatura topográfica Materiales especificados Info Vol URL Copia número Estado Notas Fecha de vencimiento Código de barras Reserva de ítems Prioridad de la cola de reserva de ejemplar Reservas para cursos
Libro Biblioteca de Derecho Mons. Fremiot Torres Oliver Colección General biblioteca derecho KF 9066 .A5 M63 2005 (Navegar estantería(Abre debajo)) Disponible 70000000831821
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This volume offers, to the greatest extent possible, definitiveinstructions on the law; presents balanced instructions that areintended to be acceptable to plaintiffs and defendants alike; andprovides instructions written in a way that juries would find helpful andinformative.

"The Model Jury Instructions handbook builds on the Section's Sample Jury Instructions, which were first published in 1987 and last updated in 1999"--Foreword.

Includes bibliographical references.

Tabla de contenidos provista por Syndetics

  • Foreword(p. xiv)
  • Preface(p. xv)
  • A Sherman Act - General
  • 1 Purpose(p. 2)
  • 2 Sherman Act Section 1(p. 3)
  • 3 Rule of Reason(p. 4)
  • 3A Overview(p. 4)
  • 3B Proof of Competitive Harm(p. 6)
  • 3C Evidence of Competitive Benefits(p. 10)
  • 3D Balancing the Competitive Effects(p. 12)
  • 4 Interstate Commerce(p. 13)
  • 5 Foreign Commerce(p. 15)
  • B Sherman Act - Section 1
  • Contract, Combination or Conspiracy
  • 1 Definition, Existence and Evidence(p. 2)
  • 2 Conscious Parallelism(p. 7)
  • 3 Corporations(p. 10)
  • 4 Participation and Intent(p. 13)
  • 5 Withdrawal(p. 16)
  • Horizontal Price Fixing
  • 1 General Elements(p. 19)
  • 2 Pricing Agreement Ancillary to Lawful Integration of Economic Activities(p. 22)
  • 3 Existence of a Conspiracy(p. 25)
  • 4 Good Intent Not a Defense(p. 26)
  • 5 Reasonableness of Prices No Excuse(p. 27)
  • 6 Evidence of Competition(p. 28)
  • 7 Evidence of Price Charged(p. 29)
  • 8 Evidence of Similarity(p. 30)
  • 9 Evidence of Exchange of Price Information(p. 32)
  • 10 Price Fixing by Exchange of Price Information(p. 34)
  • Horizontal Non-Price Restraints
  • 1 Existence of Conspiracy(p. 38)
  • 2 Allocation of Customers(p. 39)
  • 3 Allocation of Territories(p. 42)
  • 4 Allocation of Product Markets(p. 45)
  • 5 Agreement to Limit Production(p. 48)
  • 6 Group Boycott - Elements of Per se Unlawful Horizontal Concerted Refusal to Deal(p. 50)
  • 7 Group Boycott - Elements of Per se Unlawful Concerted Refusal to Deal on Nondiscriminatory Terms(p. 54)
  • 8 Associations - Exclusion(p. 57)
  • 9 Associations - Liability of Association for Acts of an Agent(p. 60)
  • 10 Associations - Liability of Member for Acts of Association(p. 62)
  • 11 Collaborative Purchasing Arrangement(p. 63)
  • Vertical Price Restraints
  • 1 Minimum Resale Price Fixing Defined(p. 67)
  • 2 Elements of Minimum Resale Price Fixing(p. 69)
  • 3 Agreement (Comment and Reference to Other Instructions)(p. 71)
  • 4 Suggested Resale Prices(p. 72)
  • 5 Unilateral Action - Colgate Doctrine(p. 74)
  • 6 Responding to Supplier's Price Changes(p. 77)
  • 7 Communications with Distributors(p. 78)
  • 8 Distributor Complaints(p. 79)
  • 9 Plaintiff's Agreement(p. 81)
  • 10 Coercion(p. 82)
  • 11 Price Promotion and Temporary Distributor Assistance(p. 84)
  • 12 Consignment Sales(p. 85)
  • 13 Maximum Resale Price Fixing Defined(p. 87)
  • 14 Elements of Maximum Resale Price Fixing(p. 88)
  • 15 Non-Price Restraints Imposed as an Integral Part of a Minimum Resale Price-Fixing Agreement(p. 90)
  • 16 Other Reasons for Termination or Refusal to Deal(p. 93)
  • Tying Arrangements
  • 1 Definition(p. 95)
  • 2 Rationale for Prohibition of Tying Arrangements(p. 96)
  • 3 Elements - Per se Unlawful Tying(p. 97)
  • 3A Elements - Unlawful Tying under Rule of Reason(p. 99)
  • 4 Presence of Two Products(p. 101)
  • 5 Trademarks as Distinct Tying Products(p. 103)
  • 6 Proof of Conditioning(p. 105)
  • 7 Existence of Market Power in Market for Tying Product(p. 106)
  • 8 Foreclosure of a Substantial Volume of Commerce In Relevant Market for Tied Product(p. 109)
  • 9 Interest of Defendant in Market for Tied Product(p. 111)
  • 10 Business Justification Defense(p. 112)
  • 11 Full-Line Forcing(p. 115)
  • Other Vertical Non-Price Restraints
  • 1 Elements(p. 118)
  • 2 Exclusive Dealing - Definition and Elements(p. 120)
  • 3 Exclusive Dealing - Rule of Reason(p. 123)
  • C Sherman Act Section 2
  • Monopolization - General
  • 1 Elements(p. 2)
  • 2 Monopoly Power Defined(p. 4)
  • 3 Relevant Market - General(p. 6)
  • 4 Relevant Product Market(p. 7)
  • 5 Relevant Product Market - Supply Substitutability(p. 11)
  • 6 Relevant Geographic Market(p. 13)
  • 7 Relevant Market - Necessity of Proof(p. 15)
  • 8 Existence of Monopoly Power - Indirect Proof(p. 16)
  • 9 Existence of Monopoly Power - Direct Proof(p. 23)
  • 10 Willful Acquisition or Maintenance of Monopoly Power(p. 26)
  • Monopolization - Refusal to Deal and Leveraging
  • 1 Essential Facility(p. 32)
  • 2 Unilateral Refusal to Deal with a Competitor(p. 36)
  • 3 Unilateral Refusal - Legitimate Business Purpose Defined(p. 39)
  • 4 Leveraging(p. 41)
  • Monopolization - Predatory Pricing
  • 1 General(p. 45)
  • 2 Definition(p. 47)
  • 3 Impossibility of Recoupment(p. 50)
  • 4 "Predatory" Pricing Distinguished from "Competition"(p. 55)
  • 5 Test of Profitability(p. 58)
  • 6 Prices Based on Expectations about Costs(p. 62)
  • 7 Prices Below Average Variable Costs But Above Marginal Cost(p. 64)
  • 8 Prices Above Average Variable Cost But Below Average Total Cost (Inglis Standard)(p. 66)
  • 9 What Products Must Be Considered in Determining Whether Prices Are Below Cost(p. 69)
  • 10 Note on Limit Pricing(p. 72)
  • 11 Prices That Meet Competition(p. 73)
  • 12 What Price "Meets" Competition(p. 76)
  • 13 Note on Distress Prices(p. 78)
  • 14 Note on Promotional Prices(p. 79)
  • 15 Volume and Market Share Discounts(p. 80)
  • Attempt to Monopolize
  • 1 Elements(p. 84)
  • 2 Anticompetitive Conduct(p. 88)
  • 3 Specific Intent(p. 90)
  • 4 Dangerous Probability of Success(p. 95)
  • Conspiracy to Monopolize
  • 1 Elements(p. 100)
  • 2 Existence of a Conspiracy(p. 103)
  • 3 Monopoly Power Defined(p. 104)
  • 4 Specific Intent(p. 105)
  • D Sherman Act - Patents
  • Patents - General
  • 1 Introduction(p. 2)
  • 2 Relation to Antitrust Laws(p. 8)
  • 3 Sherman Act [section section] 1 and 2 - General(p. 11)
  • Patent Acquisition
  • 1 General(p. 13)
  • 2 Sherman Act [section] 1 - Elements(p. 15)
  • 3 Sherman Act [section] 1 - Rule of Reason(p. 17)
  • 4 Sherman Act [section] 2 - Elements(p. 21)
  • 5 Sherman Act [section] 2 - Intent(p. 27)
  • Patent Licensing
  • Patent Licensing - Sherman Act [section] 1
  • 1 Price Restrictions(p. 30)
  • 2 Customer, Territorial, and Field of Use Restrictions - Elements(p. 34)
  • 3 Customer, Territorial, and Field of Use Restrictions - Restraint Beyond Patent Coverage(p. 37)
  • 4 Customer, Territorial, and Field of Use Restrictions - Rule of Reason(p. 39)
  • 5 "Grant-Back" Provisions - Elements(p. 41)
  • 6 "Grant-Back" Provisions - Rule of Reason(p. 43)
  • Patent Licensing - Sherman Act [section] 2
  • 7 Refusals to Deal(p. 47)
  • Patent Pools
  • 1 General(p. 49)
  • 2 Sherman Act [section] 1 (Price Fixing, Territorial Allocations, and Other Restrictions) - Elements(p. 51)
  • 3 Sherman Act [section] 1 (Price Fixing, Territorial Allocations, and Other Restrictions) - Rule of Reason(p. 54)
  • 4 Sherman Act [section] 2 - Elements(p. 58)
  • 5 Sherman Act [section] 2 - Intent(p. 60)
  • Other Patent Misconduct
  • 1 Fraudulent Procurement(p. 64)
  • 2 Sham Enforcement(p. 69)
  • E Robinson-Patman Act
  • Seller Liability - Section 2(a)
  • 1 General Definition of Price Discrimination(p. 2)
  • 2 Elements(p. 4)
  • 3 Sale of Commodities(p. 8)
  • 4 Reasonably Contemporaneous Sales(p. 10)
  • 5 Like Grade and Quality(p. 12)
  • 6 Net Prices(p. 14)
  • 7 Competitive Injury - General(p. 17)
  • 8 Competitive Injury - Primary Line(p. 18)
  • 9 Predatory Pricing(p. 21)
  • 10 Competitive Injury - Secondary and Tertiary Line(p. 22)
  • 11 Functional Discounts(p. 27)
  • 12 Meeting Competition Defense(p. 31)
  • 13 Cost Justification Defense(p. 36)
  • 14 Changing Conditions Defense(p. 39)
  • Buyer Liability - Section 2(f)
  • 1 General(p. 42)
  • 2 Elements(p. 44)
  • 3 Sale of Commodities(p. 45)
  • 4 Reasonably Contemporaneous Sales(p. 47)
  • 5 Like Grade and Quality(p. 49)
  • 6 Net Prices(p. 50)
  • 7 Competitive Injury(p. 52)
  • 8 Functional Discounts(p. 54)
  • 9 Meeting Competition Defense(p. 56)
  • 10 Cost Justification Defense(p. 59)
  • 11 Changing Conditions Defense(p. 62)
  • 12 Knowing Inducement(p. 63)
  • Other Robinson-Patman Provisions and Issues
  • 1 Brokerage Payments/Commercial Bribery - [section] 2(c)(p. 66)
  • 2 Advertising and Promotional Allowances and Services - [section section] 2(d) and 2(e)(p. 70)
  • 3 Availability(p. 75)
  • 4 Single Seller(p. 77)
  • 5 Note on Damages in Robinson-Patman Cases(p. 79)
  • F Causation and Damages
  • Clayton Act [section] 4 Requirements
  • 1 Injury and Causation(p. 2)
  • 2 Business or Property(p. 7)
  • Damages
  • 1 Effect of Instruction as to Damages(p. 11)
  • 2 Antitrust Damages - Introduction and Purpose(p. 12)
  • 2A Antitrust Damages - Bifurcated Trial(p. 14)
  • 3 Speculation Not Permitted(p. 15)
  • 4 Causation and Disaggregation(p. 18)
  • 5 Damages for Purchasers - Overcharges Based on Horizontal Price Fixing, Output Restriction, Market Allocation, or Other Agreements Not to Compete(p. 22)
  • 6 Damages for Purchasers - Damages for Tying Arrangements(p. 24)
  • 7 Damages for Purchasers - Class Damages(p. 26)
  • 8 Damages for Competitors - Lost Profits(p. 27)
  • 9 Damages for Competitors - Future Lost Profits(p. 33)
  • 10 Damages for Competitors - Going Concern Value or Goodwill(p. 39)
  • 11 Damages for Competitors - Preparedness to Enter Business(p. 42)
  • 12 Damages for Sellers - Buyer Price Fixing(p. 44)
  • 13 Expert Testimony(p. 46)
  • 14 Mitigation(p. 47)
  • 15 Multiple Plaintiffs(p. 49)
  • 16 Plaintiff's Participation(p. 50)
  • 17 Trebling of Damages(p. 52)
  • G Miscellaneous
  • Certain Defenses and Exemptions
  • 1 Statute of Limitations(p. 2)
  • 2 Fraudulent Concealment(p. 3)
  • 3 Noerr-Pennington - Lobbying(p. 8)
  • 4 Sham Litigation(p. 12)
  • Invocation of the Fifth Amendment
  • 1 By a Party or a Witness Identified with a Party(p. 18)
  • 2 By a Nonparty Witness(p. 20)
  • Clayton Act [section] 5(a) - Evidentiary Effect of Litigated Governmental Judgments
  • 1 Criminal Conviction(p. 24)
  • 2 Civil Judgment(p. 26)
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