Descripciones mejoradas de Syndetics:

For over 200 years, Congress and the President have locked horns on an issue that will not, and cannot go away: legislative access to executive branch information. Presidents and their advisers often claim that the sought-for information is covered by the doctrine of executive privilege and other principles that protect confidentiality among presidential advisers. For its part, Congress will articulate persuasive reasons why legislative access is crucial. In terms of constitutional principles, these battles are largely a standoff, and court decisions in this area are interesting but hardly dispositive. What usually breaks the deadlock is a political decision: the determination of lawmakers to use the coercive tools available to them, and political calculations by the executive branch whether a continued standoff risks heavy and intolerable losses for the President.

Many useful and thoughtful standards have been developed to provide guidance for executive-legislative disputes over access to information. Those standards, constructive as they are, are set aside at times to achieve what both branches may decide has higher importance; settling differences and moving on. Legal and constitutional principles, finely-honed as they might be, are often overridden by the politics of the moment and practical considerations. Efforts to discover enduring and enforceable norms in this area invariably fall short.

Efforts to resolve interbranch disputes on purely legal grounds may have to give ground in the face of superior political muscle by a Congress determined to exercise the many coercive tools available to it. By the same token, a Congress that is internally divided or uncertain about its institutional powers, or unwilling to grind it out until the documents are delivered, will lose out in a quest for information. Moreover, both branches are at the mercy of political developments that can come around the corner without warning and tilt the advantage decisively to one side.

It is tempting to see the executive-legislative clashes only as a confrontation between two branches, yielding a winner and a loser. It is more than that. Congressional access represents part of the framers' belief in representative government. When lawmakers are unable (or unwilling) to obtain executive branch information needed for congressional deliberations, the loss extends to the public, democracy, and constitutional government. The system of checks and balances and separation of powers are essential to protect individual rights and liberties.

This book is also available in paper binding.

"[T]ightly reasoned, nuanced, and thoroughly researched." -- Athan Theoharis, Marquette University Political Science Quarterly

Tabla de contenidos provista por Syndetics

• Foreword(p. xi)
• Introduction(p. xv)
• 1. Constitutional Principles(p. 3)
• Early Skirmishes(p. 6)
• Robert Morris Inquiry(p. 6)
• Steuben's Annuity(p. 7)
• St. Clair Investigation(p. 10)
• Investigating Hamilton(p. 11)
• Diplomatic Correspondence with France(p. 13)
• The Contempt Power(p. 14)
• Judicial Guidelines(p. 17)
• Presidential Challenges(p. 19)
• 2. The Appropriations Power(p. 27)
• Power of the Purse(p. 27)
• Warm-Up Debates in 1789(p. 28)
• Treaty Disputes, 1791-96(p. 30)
• Algerine Treaty(p. 30)
• Jay Treaty(p. 33)
• Louisiana Purchase(p. 39)
• House Participation in Treaty Power(p. 40)
• Funding the Contras(p. 45)
• Legislative Vetoes(p. 46)
• 3. The Impeachment Power(p. 49)
• Presidential Policies(p. 49)
• Andrew Jackson Fights Back(p. 51)
• The Senate Resolution(p. 51)
• The House Investigation(p. 52)
• Impeaching Andrew Johnson(p. 57)
• Watergate(p. 58)
• Iran-Contra(p. 62)
• Clinton's Impeachment(p. 64)
• Is Censure an Option?(p. 67)
• 4. The Appointment Power(p. 71)
• Kleindienst Nomination(p. 71)
• L. Patrick Gray III(p. 74)
• Judicial Nominations(p. 76)
• Rehnquist for Chief Justice(p. 76)
• Robert Bork(p. 77)
• Stephen Trott(p. 79)
• Miguel Estrada(p. 79)
• Ambassador to Guyana(p. 81)
• Environmental Crimes Section (DOJ)(p. 82)
• Senate "Holds"(p. 84)
• Must the Senate Always Act?(p. 88)
• 5. Congressional Subpoenas(p. 91)
• Issuing a Subpoena(p. 91)
• Immunity(p. 94)
• The Ashland Case(p. 95)
• DOJ Opinion: Seizing Suspects Abroad(p. 97)
• DOJ Documents: The Inslaw Affair(p. 100)
• Whitewater Notes(p. 103)
• FBI Corruption in Boston(p. 106)
• 6. The Contempt Power(p. 111)
• Actions from 1975 to 1981(p. 112)
• Rogers C. B. Morton(p. 112)
• David Mathews(p. 114)
• Henry Kissinger(p. 116)
• Joseph A. Califano, Jr.(p. 118)
• Charles W. Duncan, Jr.(p. 121)
• James B. Edwards(p. 123)
• James Watt(p. 124)
• Gorsuch Contempt(p. 126)
• Travelgate and Jack Quinn(p. 130)
• Contempt Action against Reno(p. 132)
• 7. House Resolutions of Inquiry(p. 135)
• Origins of the Procedure(p. 136)
• Committee and Floor Procedures(p. 138)
• Administrative Discretion(p. 140)
• Committee Review(p. 142)
• Committee Amendments(p. 143)
• Adverse Reports(p. 144)
• Competing Investigations(p. 147)
• Discharging a Committee(p. 149)
• Military Operations in Vietnam(p. 150)
• Forcing Other Legislative Actions(p. 154)
• Supplemental Hearings(p. 154)
• Triggering Legislation(p. 156)
• Mexico Rescue Package(p. 157)
• Iraq's Declaration on WMD(p. 158)
• 8. The "Seven Member Rule"(p. 161)
• Origin of the Statute(p. 161)
• Applying the Statute(p. 165)
• The Waxman Request(p. 167)
• District Court Decision(p. 168)
• Request for Reconsideration(p. 172)
• Briefs for the Ninth Circuit(p. 173)
• 9. GAO Investigations(p. 179)
• Statutory Authorities(p. 179)
• Problems of Access(p. 180)
• The GAO-Cheney Face-Off(p. 183)
• The Legislative Request(p. 184)
• Challenging GAO's Legal Authority(p. 187)
• The Demand Letter(p. 189)
• Going to Court(p. 192)
• The Court Decides(p. 195)
• Lieberman's Subpoenas(p. 196)
• 10. Testimony by White House Officials(p. 199)
• Watergate and Its Aftermath(p. 199)
• Cutting One's Losses(p. 202)
• The Clinton Years(p. 203)
• White House-Treasury Contacts(p. 204)
• Travel Office Firings(p. 205)
• Security of FBI Files(p. 206)
• Presidential Pardons(p. 208)
• Scope of the Power(p. 208)
• Basic Procedures(p. 210)
• FALN Clemency(p. 211)
• Marc Rich et al.(p. 216)
• Clinton's Defense(p. 219)
• Grand Jury Probe(p. 222)
• Tom Ridge(p. 224)
• 11. National Security Claims(p. 229)
• Controlling National Security Information(p. 230)
• Commander in Chief(p. 231)
• Head of the Executive Branch(p. 233)
• "Sole Organ" in Foreign Affairs(p. 236)
• Role of the Courts(p. 237)
• The Pentagon Papers(p. 238)
• Recent Statutory Changes(p. 240)
• Department of the Navy v. Egan (1988)(p. 241)
• The Garfinkel Case(p. 243)
• Settling Executive-Legislative Collisions(p. 245)
• The AT&T Cases(p. 246)
• Proceedings against Henry Kissinger(p. 247)
• The James Watt Episode(p. 248)
• Charges about Congressional "Leaks"(p. 248)
• Congressional Access to Executive Branch Employees(p. 251)
• The Lloyd-LaFollette Act(p. 251)
• Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989(p. 254)
• Congressional Action in 1998(p. 254)
• Conclusions(p. 257)
• Subject Index(p. 261)
• Index of Cases(p. 270)

Notas de autor provistas por Syndetics

Louis Fisher is Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers at the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress.