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After 30 years, the debate over antitrust's ideology has quieted. Mostnow agree that the protection of consumer welfare should be the onlygoal of antitrust laws. Execution, however, is another matter. The rulesof antitrust remain unfocused, insufficiently precise and excessivelycomplex. The problem of poorly designed rules is severe, because inthe short run rules weigh much more heavily than principles. At bottom, antitrust is a defensible enterprise only if it can make themicroeconomy work better, after accounting for the considerable costsof operating the system

Tabla de contenidos provista por Syndetics

• Preface(p. vii)
• Introduction(p. 1)
• I Limits and Possibilities(p. 11)
• 1 The Legal and Economic Structure of the Antitrust Laws(p. 13)
• 2 The Design of Antitrust Rules(p. 31)
• 3 The Promises and Hazards of Private Antitrust Enforcement(p. 57)
• 4 Expert Testimony and the Predicament of Antitrust Fact Finding(p. 77)
• II Traditional Antitrust Rules(p. 93)
• 5 Unreasonable Exercises of Market Power(p. 95)
• 6 Combinations of Competitors(p. 125)
• 7 Dominant Firms and Exclusionary Practices(p. 150)
• 8 Antitrust and Distribution(p. 181)
• 9 The National Policy on Business Mergers(p. 207)
• III Regulation, Innovation, and Connectivity(p. 225)
• 10 Antitrust under Regulation and Deregulation(p. 227)
• 11 The Conflict between Antitrust and Intellectual Property Rights(p. 249)
• 12 Network Industries and Computer Platform Monopoly(p. 277)
• Epilogue: Antitrust Reform(p. 305)
• Notes(p. 315)
• Index(p. 363)

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CHOICE Review

Hovenkamp (Univ. of Iowa College of Law) applies his considerable expertise to an objective study of the relationship between microeconomic theory and court interpretation of US antitrust laws. He argues that, in spite of a history of conflicting goals, there is currently a consensus that the purpose of antitrust is to promote consumer welfare. He argues further, however, that the rules applied by the courts often do a very poor job of achieving that goal. Hovenkamp raises a number of issues involving economic incentives, treble damage suits, the ability of juries to interpret expert testimony, the impracticality of attempting to identify and remedy certain antitrust violations, and the balancing of benefits and costs, among others. The author maintains that while some of the problems require legislative remedies, most can be corrected by the courts, and he offers a set of practical suggestions. This work will be of value to scholars and practitioners alike, as well as anyone interested in antitrust enforcement. ^BSumming Up: Highly recommended. Public, academic (lower-division undergraduate and up), and research and professional library collections. D. F. Sheets formerly, Missouri State University