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How should a judge's moral convictions bear on his judgments about what the law is? The author charts a variety of dimensions in which law and morals are interwoven. He argues that pragmatism is empty as a theory of law, and that value pluralism misunderstands the nature of moral concepts.

Tabla de contenidos provista por Syndetics

• Introduction: Law and Morals(p. 1)
• 1 Pragmatism and Law(p. 36)
• 2 In Praise of Theory(p. 49)
• 3 Darwin's New Bulldog(p. 75)
• 4 Moral Pluralism(p. 105)
• 5 Originalism and Fidelity(p. 117)
• 6 Hart's Postscript and the Point of Political Philosophy(p. 140)
• 7 Thirty Years On(p. 187)
• 8 The Concepts of Law(p. 223)
• 9 Rawls and the Law(p. 241)
• Notes(p. 263)
• Sources(p. 297)
• Index(p. 299)

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Publishers Weekly Review

Dworkin, a professor of law and philosophy at NYU Law School and University College, London, has for a generation been an influential voice in the rarefied debate that has raged in academia over how best to construct a logically consistent and philosophically useful description of what law is and what law should do. In addition, Dworkin has been a strong voice defending the jurisprudence that supports abortion rights, free speech and other liberal positions in more public debates. Consistent with both roles, these essays explicate Dworkin's notion that law must have a moral component, and deconstruct and criticize the ideas of competing theorists. Against some of them, like the prolific Richard Posner, he takes the gloves off. For example, Dworkin describes one aspect of Posner's jurisprudence as "remarkably implausible," strong words from a philosopher. Dworkin's debate with others is more measured, but he is willing to step into the ring with each and defend his ideas. This is a serious, difficult book that succeeds in explaining what Dworkin believes, what the other theorists argue, and why it matters who is right. (Apr.) (c) Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved

CHOICE Review

Dworkin (law and philosophy, New York Univ.), a respected judicial scholar, attempts to provide a "general theory" of law, while identifying three necessary stages of legal analysis: semantics, jurisprudential, and doctrinal. The combination of these three components provides the basis for a deeper understanding of the authentic interconnectivity between law and morals, according to Dworkin. The work consists of eight previously published essays and one new essay; it possesses the typical limitations of an edited collection of essays composed by a single author over an extended period of time (a decade and a half). Many worthwhile topics are examined, but the collection lacks thematic cohesion and purpose. Chapters one through three are critiques of Richard Rorty, Stanley Fish, Cass Sunstein, and Richard Posner. Chapter four is devoted to refuting Isaiah Berlin's alleged "moral pluralism." The remaining five chapters are assessments of H. L. A. Hart, Antonin Scalia, John Rawls, and other thinkers, as well as a defense of Dworkin's earlier scholarship. Finally, Dworkin's attempted refutation of "originalism" is predictable, given his well-known opinions on the subject. ^BSumming Up: Recommended. Graduate students through practitioners. H. L. Cheek Jr. Brewton-Parker College

Notas de autor provistas por Syndetics

Valerie Knowles is an Ottawa writer who has taught history and worked as an archivist. In addition to writing for newspapers, magazines, and federal government departments, she has published several non-fiction works, including Strangers at Our Gates: Canadian Immigration and Immigration Policy, 154-1997 . This is her third book for Dundurn Press.