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The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction was established in 2004 and charged with examining capabilities and challenges of American intelligence community concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign powers relating to the design, development, manufacture, acquisition, possession, proliferation, transfer, testing, potential or threatened use, or use of weapons of mass destruction, related means of delivery, and other related threats of the 21st Century. This official report to the president presents 74 recommendations for improving the United States Intelligence community.

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• Summary of Contents
• Overview
• Part 1 Looking Back Introduction to Part One
• Chapter 1 Iraq
• Chapter 2 Libya
• Chapter 3 Al-Qa'ida in Afghanistan
• Chapter 4 Terrorism: Managing Today's Threat
• Chapter 5 Iran and North Korea: Monitoring The Development of Nuclear Weapons
• Part 2 Looking Forward Introduction to Part Two
• Chapter 6 Leadership and Management: Forging an Integrated Intelligence Community
• Chapter 7 Collection
• Chapter 8 Analysis
• Chapter 9 Information Sharing
• Chapter 10 Intelligence at Home: The FBI, Justice, and Homeland Security
• Chapter 11 Counterintelligence
• Chapter 12 Covert Action
• Chapter 13 The Changing Proliferation Threat and the Intelligence Response
• Conclusion Postscript: Additional Intelligence Challenges
• Appendices
• Appendix A Authorizing Executive Order
• Appendix B List of Findings and Recommendations
• Appendix C An Intelligence Community Primer
• Appendix D Common Abbreviations
• Appendix E Biographical Information for Commissioners and List of Commission Staff

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On the brink of war, and in front of the whole world, the United States government asserted that Saddam Hussein had reconstituted his nuclear weapons program, had biological weapons and mobile biological weapon production facilities, and had stockpiled and was producing chemical weapons. All of this was based on the assessments of the U.S. Intelligence Community. And not one bit of it could be confirmed when the war was over. Excerpted from The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction All rights reserved by the original copyright owners. Excerpts are provided for display purposes only and may not be reproduced, reprinted or distributed without the written permission of the publisher.

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Executive Office of the President; and the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction