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In the second edition of Murder as a Business Decision , a new chapter is added that covers aspects of additional real world planned homicide investigations. The new material covers investigations related to FBI undercover operation Strawman in Kansas City. Public record material is included and case investigations are described generically. Planned homicide investigations are analyzed and contrasted with economic based investigative techniques. There is an expanded analysis of whether FBI profiles are technically efficient in planned homicide investigation and a theory is developed that explains and predicts common observations related to FBI assistance in homicide investigation.

Tabla de contenidos provista por Syndetics

• List of Illustrations(p. xi)
• List of Tables(p. xii)
• Preface(p. xv)
• Part 1 An Introduction to Economics and Criminal Behavior
• 1. Consumer Choice Theory(p. 1)
• The Utility Maximizing Consumer(p. 1)
• Total and Marginal Utility(p. 4)
• Utility Ranking(p. 15)
• Elasticities(p. 24)
• 2. Producer Choice Theory(p. 29)
• Similarities in Consumption and Production(p. 29)
• A Short-Run Production Process(p. 31)
• Production and Cost Functions(p. 35)
• Optimal Output and Production Efficiency(p. 38)
• Statistics and Probabilities(p. 50)
• 3. Choice Theory and Criminal Behavior(p. 55)
• Consumer Choice Theory and Crime(p. 55)
• Illegal Speeding as an Optimal Choice(p. 56)
• Constrained Choice and Deterrence(p. 60)
• Producer Choice and Deterrence(p. 65)
• The Optimal Level of Resources(p. 72)
• Alternative Theories of Criminal Behavior(p. 74)
• Part 2 Murder as a Business Decision
• 4. Theoretical Aspects(p. 81)
• The Appropriate Level of Information(p. 81)
• The SEU Model of Murder as a Business Decision(p. 83)
• The Effect of Perfect Information(p. 88)
• Murder Consequences as Events(p. 91)
• A Less Complex Model(p. 93)
• Inexperienced Offender(p. 96)
• Experienced Offender(p. 97)
• The Effect of Better Information(p. 97)
• The Effect of Perfect Information(p. 99)
• SEU and the Criminal Organization(p. 100)
• 5. Apprehension Risk Sensitivity(p. 103)
• The Risk-Seeking Offender(p. 103)
• Additional Factors Suggesting Apprehension Risk(p. 106)
• The Risk-Seeking Utility Function and The Murder Demand Curve(p. 107)
• Murder Demand and Optimal Choices(p. 113)
• Deterrence Production(p. 116)
• 6. The Characteristics of Planned Homicides(p. 123)
• The Need for a Crime Type Profile(p. 123)
• Limitations of Existing Profiles(p. 124)
• Using an Economic Model as the Basis for a Criminal Profile(p. 127)
• Model Development(p. 129)
• Statistical Issues(p. 130)
• Defining Rational Homicides(p. 132)
• Decision Parameter Variables(p. 142)
• Empirical Results and Crime Type Profile(p. 148)
• Apprehension Risk Vector (p)(p. 152)
• Opportunity Cost Vector (Y)(p. 153)
• Gains Vector (G)(p. 153)
• Profile Implications(p. 153)
• 7. Murder Investigation(p. 159)
• Murder Investigation No. 1(p. 160)
• Murder Investigation No. 2(p. 160)
• Additional Aspects of Murder Investigation No. 2(p. 163)
• An Economic Based Murder Investigation(p. 166)
• Additional Considerations(p. 174)
• 8. Criminal Justice System Production(p. 179)
• Bad Policies(p. 180)
• The Need for More CJS Resources(p. 183)
• Targeting Resources to Maximize Returns(p. 187)
• The Vince Foster Case(p. 188)
• Specialized Resources and Training(p. 190)
• The Risk of Conviction(p. 191)
• Additional Outputs: Rehabilitation and Incapacitation(p. 196)
• 9. In Search of Technical Efficiency(p. 199)
• Endnotes(p. 211)
• Bibliography(p. 223)
• Index(p. 227)

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