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A scholar of medieval culture, Greek and Roman history, and government and politics before he retired in 1991, Paolucci began attacking Kissinger's policies with his 1972 Who is Kissinger?, and continued in 1980 with Kissinger's War: 1957- 1975. Those two polemics along with seven shorter pieces published in various journals are compiled here as a help to mainstream critics who are just now starting to notice what the US diplomat was up to. There is no index. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)

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• Preface(p. 5)
• About The Walter Bagehot Research Council On National Sovereignty(p. 7)
• Part 1 Who is Kissinger?(p. 13)
• Publisher's Foreword to the 1980 Edition(p. 17)
• Author's Preface to the First Edition (1972)(p. 19)
• 1. "Nixon's Most Astute Appointment"(p. 22)
• Critic of the Eisenhower-Dulles Strategy(p. 23)
• The Limited-War Strategy(p. 25)
• Beyond the Nation State(p. 27)
• The Kissinger Riddle(p. 28)
• 2. Nixon's Supreme Strategist(p. 31)
• 3. Our Captive President: The Ascendancy of a Supranationalist Professor(p. 37)
• 4. The Last War(p. 43)
• 5. Kissinger, Poor Richard, and National Review(p. 48)
• 6. Conclusion(p. 54)
• Part 2 Kissinger's War: 1957-1975(p. 57)
• Note to the 1980 Edition(p. 58)
• 7. Introduction: The Kissinger Legacy(p. 59)
• The War in Theory: Kissinger's Apprenticeship(p. 60)
• Back Door to Nixon(p. 66)
• The Buckley "Passport"(p. 69)
• The Clark Clifford Connection(p. 71)
• Nixon's Inaugural: The Pledge to Negotiate(p. 75)
• What Price Kissinger?(p. 78)
• 8. The Detente Power-Vacuum(p. 82)
• Kissinger's "Detente or Bust" Policy(p. 83)
• C. B. Marshall on the Logic of Detente(p. 85)
• 9. Our Vietnam Defeat: Why the Six-Year Delay?(p. 91)
• Kissinger's Limited-War Doctrine(p. 93)
• 10. The Crime of No-Win Belligerency(p. 95)
• Angola and Watergate(p. 96)
• The Soft Core(p. 99)
• Kissinger's Protracted Deception(p. 100)
• 11. An Exemplary Debate on Angola: Tunney, Stevenson, Goldwater, and Helms(p. 104)
• Senator Byrd on the Role of Congress(p. 106)
• Tunney Cites Taft(p. 108)
• The Stevenson-Goldwater Resolution(p. 108)
• Garn and Domenici(p. 110)
• Helms' Rejection of Negotiated Settlements(p. 111)
• 12. The "Secret" Kremlin Speech(p. 114)
• A "Nixon" Profile for the Kremlin Leaders(p. 115)
• The Carrot and the Stick(p. 119)
• Euphoria in Warsaw(p. 120)
• 13. Kissinger's War: A Revisionist Perspective(p. 124)
• Theory in Action: The Moscow Summit of 1972(p. 126)
• The Incredible Credibility Doctrine(p. 129)
• False Counselors, Benighted Presidents(p. 131)
• 14. Carter and Moynihan vs. Kissinger: Freedom or Peace?(p. 133)
• George Will: The Detente Drunk Has Ended(p. 133)
• "How Much Does Freedom Matter?"(p. 135)
• Johnson's Fall, Nixon's Rise(p. 139)
• Kissinger or Moynihan?(p. 141)
• 15. From Kant to Kissinger and Brzezinski(p. 142)
• Kant's Imperative for Peace(p. 142)
• Carl Friedrich's Marxist Transformation(p. 144)
• From Friedrich to Rostow(p. 145)
• Kissinger and Kant at the U.N.(p. 147)
• Brzezinski and Gardner(p. 149)
• The Peace and Freedom of Peers(p. 152)
• 16. Conclusion: The Fixed Fight(p. 156)
• Part 3 More on Kissinger(p. 165)
• 17. Vietnam: Mask of Peace(p. 167)
• 18. The Atrocities of March 1968(p. 172)
• 19. Camouflaged Surrender in Vietnam: Nixon Must Dismiss Kissinger or Kissinger Must Voluntarily Resign(p. 177)
• 20. A Red-China Puppet Show: Nixon Kowtows, Kissinger Pulls the Strings(p. 181)
• 21. "However Vague, However Elusive, However Indirect": Kissinger's Plea for a Face-Saving Formula(p. 185)
• 22. National Reviews's White House Contact: The Kissinger-Buckley Odyssey(p. 189)
• 23. Will America Surrender?(p. 198)
• Appendix (From the Congressional Record, August 4, 1971)(p. 205)
• About ... Who is Kissinger?"(p. 211)
• Henry Paolucci(p. 212)