Descripciones mejoradas de Syndetics:

In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, a critical abortion rights case, a bitterly divided Supreme Court produced no less than six different opinions. Writing for the plurality, Chief Justice Rehnquist attacked the trimester framework established in Roe v. Wade because it was "not found in the text of the Constitution or in any place else one would expect to find a constitutional principle." This approach, writes legal authority Joseph Goldstein, confuses constitutional principles (in this case, the right to privacy) with the means to protect them (here, the trimester system). As a result, the Court left the public bewildered about the constitutional scope of a woman's right to reproductive choice--failing in its duty to speak clearly to the American public about the Constitution. In The Intelligible Constitution, Goldstein makes a compelling argument that, in a democracy based upon informed consent, the Supreme Court has an obligation to communicate clearly and candidly to We the People when it interprets the Constitution. After a fascinating discussion of the language of the Constitution and Supreme Court opinions (including the analysis of Webster), he presents a series of opinion studies in important cases, focusing not on ideology but on the Justices' clarity of thought and expression. Using the two Brown v. Board of Education cases, Cooper v. Aaron, Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, and others as his examples, Goldstein demonstrates the pitfalls to which the Court has succumbed in the past: Writing deliberately ambiguous decisions to win the votes of colleagues, challenging each others' opinions in private but not in public, and not speaking honestly when the writer knows a concurring Justice misunderstands the opinion which he or she is supporting. Even some landmark decisions, he writes, have featured seriously flawed opinions--preventing We the People from understanding why the Justices reasoned as they did, and why they disagreed with each other. He goes on to suggest five "canons of comprehensibility" for Supreme Court opinions, to ensure that the Justices explain themselves clearly, honestly, and unambiguously, so that all the various opinions in each case would constitute a comprehensible message about their accord and discord in interpreting the Constitution. Both a fascinating look at how the Court shapes its opinions and a clarion call to action, this book provides an important addition to our understanding of how to maintain the Constitution as a living document, by and for the People, in its third century.

Tabla de contenidos provista por Syndetics

• Acknowledgments(p. vii)
• A Foreword(p. xi)
• Part I Why an Intelligible Constitution(p. 1)
• Chapter 1 Made for an Undefined Future(p. 3)
• Part II Opinion Studies(p. 21)
• Chapter 2 with Studied Ambiguity: National League of Cities V. Usery and Garcia V. San Antonio Metro Transit Authority(p. 25)
• Chapter 3 Had Understanding Been the Goal: Cooper V. Aaron(p. 43)
• Chapter 4 Decisions Unexplained: The Brown V. Board of Education Cases(p. 57)
• Chapter 5 Failing to Take Their Own and Each Other's Opinions Seriously: Regents of the University of California V. Bakke(p. 81)
• Part III Canons of Comprehensibility(p. 105)
• Chapter 6 Toward the Intelligible Constitution(p. 109)
• Appendix: The Constitution of the United States(p. 135)
• Notes(p. 163)
• Case Index(p. 195)
• Name Index(p. 197)
• Index(p. 199)

Reseñas proporcionadas por Syndetics

CHOICE Review

Goldstein's three-part essay addresses an apparently simple proposition: that "the justices [of the Supreme Court] have an obligation to maintain the Constitution, in opinions of the Court. . .as something intelligble something that We the People of the United States can understand." To this end, Pt. 1 answers the question "Why an Intelligible Constitution?" with the repeated assertion (surely justified) that the Constitution can remain the possession of the People only if We can understand it, both in its fundamental statement and in the opinions (interpretations, explanations) of the Court. Part 2 analyzes a limited group of opinions to demonstrate the studied ambiguity (inadvertent due to the Court's own lack of understanding, lack of explanation, and failure to take opinions seriously) that characterizes the Court's work. This last failing lack of "seriousness" is the author's way of designating the inconsistencies and departures from prior doctrine and precedent he finds in opinions of the Court as well as in concurrences and dissents. Finally, to minimize, if not entirely avoid such shortcomings, Pt. 3 presents "Canons of Comprehensibility" which Goldstein believes would go far to overcome the present barriers to understanding. The first ("Use simple and precise language 'level to the understanding of all'") rearticulates his goal and demonstrates the essay's greatest difficulty. No one can object to rational, impersonal, and communicable opinions that "rest on fundamental presuppositions rooted in history to which widespread acceptance may fairly be attributed" (Felix Frankfurter), but how does this concern address the fifth of We the People who are functionally illiterate or the greater fraction who do not regularly consult any printed matter (let alone court opinions) however intelligible? Goldstein is clearly on the side of the constitutional angels; the difficulty is to find the head of the pin on which he wishes to dance. Recommended for all readers. L. Weinstein; Smith College

Notas de autor provistas por Syndetics

About the Author: Joseph Goldstein is Sterling Professor of Law at Yale University Law School, and is the author and coauthor of a number of books on the law, including The Government of a British Trade Union, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, and Criminal Law, Theory, and Process.