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Over the last forty years modern constitutional scholarship has concentrated on an analysis of rights, while principles of constitutional law concerning the structure of government have been largely downplayed. The irony of this interpretive emphasis is that the body of the Constitution contains relatively little dealing directly with rights. Rather, it is primarily a blueprint for the establishment of a complex form of federal-democratic structure. This work emphasizes the central role served by the structural portions of the Constitution. Redish argues that these structural values were designed to provide the framework in which our rights-based system may flourish, and that judicial abandonment of these structural values threatens the very foundations of American political theory.

Tabla de contenidos provista por Syndetics

• Preface(p. vii)
• 1 Introduction: Political Structure, Democratic Theory, and Constitutional Text(p. 3)
• 2 Federalism, the Constitution, and American Political Theory(p. 23)
• Conclusion(p. 60)
• 3 The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism(p. 63)
• 4 Pragmatic Formalism and Separation of Powers(p. 99)
• Conclusion(p. 133)
• 5 (p. 135)
• 6 Conclusion: Liberalism, Constitutional Theory, and Political Structure(p. 163)
• Notes(p. 167)
• Table of Cases(p. 223)
• Index(p. 227)

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CHOICE Review

The "Washington gridlock" which concerned so many during the past elections means federalism to Redish, and he embraces it as he imagines it was embraced by its designers. He has a point. Students of civil liberties have concentrated on the Bill of Rights and its guarantees of personal freedoms against government encroachment, an emphasis reflected in the way constitutional law is frequently taught: one course on "structure and process" and one on civil rights and civil liberties, with emphasis on the latter. Yet for Redish and the framers of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights is somewhat redundant if scholars and jurists interpret the structure and process sections of the Constitution properly. It was, above all, the way the framers built a special kind of "gridlock" into its structure and processes which checked the government at every point where it might encroach upon liberty. Redish does a fine job examining key aspects of this design--the commerce clause, the separation of powers doctrine (for which he proposes his intriguing "pragmatic formalism" approach), and the principle of nondelegation of legislative authority--showing how proper attention to these areas limits government and enhances liberty. The one place he falters is in his call to consider corporations as citizens under the privileges and immunities clause--it seems clearly to contradict his own line of argument. Redish's language is technical, but his writing is solid and bracing. Extensive notes and references. Highly recommended for students of constitutional law at all levels. M. Berheide; Berea College

Notas de autor provistas por Syndetics

Martin H. Redish is at Northwestern University School of Law.