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" This book does the near-impossible and provides a clearly written and objective primer that actually explains the budget process in lay terms.... This one should be on the desk of anyone who wants to follow the raging debates about appropriations, budgets, line-item vetoes, and constitutional amendments." The New York Times Book Review "An up-to-date, clear explanation of the federal budget. From the formulation of a federal agency's funding request to the final legislative appropriation, Schick has captured on paper the complex process. More importantly, he has captured the politics of federal budgeting from the original lofty goals to the stark realities of today." Senator Pete V. Domenici "Anyone who wants to understand federal budgeting should read this book.... Federal budgeting has complex rules and arcane terms, but Schick has a gift for explanations that are clear, entertaining, and insightful." Rep. Martin Olav Sabo An essential guide to the federal budget process, this book bringstogether three critical elements of budget strategy: the political tactics and relationships that determine budgetary success or failure; the policy objectives pursued through the budget's revenue and spending proposals; and the rules and procedures that govern congressional and presidential action on these proposals. Documents used in federal budgeting are highlighted to show how the process affects policy outcomes. Allen Schick is a visiting fellow in the Governmental Studies program at Brookings and professor of political science at George Mason University. His books on federal budgeting include The Capacity to Budget (Urban Institute, 1990) and Congress and Money (Urban Institute, 1980).

Tabla de contenidos provista por Syndetics

• 1 Conflict and Resolution in Federal Budgeting(p. 1)
• Conflict(p. 2)
• Resolution(p. 4)
• The Two Worlds of Budgeting(p. 5)
• 2 The Evolution of Federal Budgeting: From Surplus to Deficit to Surplus(p. 8)
• Legislative Dominance: 1789-1921(p. 9)
• Presidential Dominance: 1921-74(p. 14)
• Congress versus the President: 1974-2000(p. 18)
• How the Budget Was Balanced(p. 26)
• Overview of the Annual Budget Cycle(p. 30)
• Conclusion(p. 34)
• 3 The Budget's Shifting Boundaries(p. 36)
• Receipts, Budgetary Resources, and Outlays(p. 36)
• Scope of the Budget(p. 38)
• Measuring the Budget(p. 44)
• Conclusion(p. 47)
• 4 The Political Rules and Arithmetic of Budgeting(p. 48)
• Budget Enforcement Rules(p. 49)
• Discretionary and Direct Spending(p. 50)
• The Politics of Budgetary Arithmetic(p. 54)
• Baseline Projections(p. 56)
• The Politics of Scoring(p. 60)
• Economic Arithmetic(p. 70)
• When Politics Meets Economics(p. 72)
• Conclusion(p. 73)
• 5 The President's Budget(p. 74)
• Presidential Roles and Styles(p. 75)
• Changes in Presidential Budgeting(p. 79)
• Formulating the President's Budget(p. 81)
• The Office of Management and Budget(p. 86)
• The President's Budget in Congress(p. 90)
• The Veto Power(p. 93)
• Information in the President's Budget(p. 97)
• Conclusion(p. 98)
• 6 The Congressional Budget Process(p. 105)
• Why Congress Has a Budget Resolution(p. 106)
• Structure and Content of the Budget Resolution(p. 110)
• Formulating the Budget Resolution(p. 118)
• Floor Action(p. 119)
• Why the Resolution Is Rarely Adopted on Schedule(p. 123)
• The Reconciliation Process(p. 125)
• Enforcing Congressional Budget Decisions(p. 129)
• Scoring and Scorekeeping(p. 134)
• Conclusion(p. 137)
• 7 Revenue Legislation(p. 139)
• Revenue Legislation in Congress(p. 140)
• PAYGO Rules(p. 146)
• Impact of PAYGO on Congressional Behavior(p. 147)
• Tax Expenditures(p. 148)
• Rates versus Breaks: The 1980s versus the 1990s(p. 150)
• Trends in Federal Revenue(p. 152)
• Sources of Federal Revenue(p. 154)
• Who Pays Federal Taxes?(p. 157)
• User Charges(p. 160)
• Offsetting Collections(p. 161)
• Conclusion(p. 161)
• 8 Authorizing Legislation(p. 163)
• Types of Authorizing Legislation(p. 164)
• Authorizing Legislation in Congress(p. 172)
• The Relationship of Authorizations and Appropriations(p. 175)
• Direct Spending Legislation(p. 181)
• Conclusion(p. 185)
• 9 The Appropriations Process(p. 186)
• Types of Appropriations Acts(p. 187)
• Tradition and Change(p. 189)
• The Appropriations Committees and Their Subcommittees(p. 193)
• Procedures and Politics of Committee Action(p. 202)
• Procedures and Politics of House and Senate Action(p. 215)
• Supplemental and Continuing Appropriations(p. 223)
• Structure and Content of Appropriations Measures(p. 229)
• Legislation and Limitations in Appropriations Acts(p. 235)
• Interpreting Appropriations Measures(p. 235)
• Conclusion(p. 238)
• 10 Managing Federal Expenditures(p. 241)
• Spending Budget Resources(p. 242)
• Managing Agency Finances(p. 255)
• Conclusion(p. 266)
• 11 The Self-Correcting Budget Process(p. 267)
• The Adequacy of Budget Controls(p. 270)
• The Future of Self-Correction(p. 272)
• Improving Self-Correction(p. 278)
• Federal Budget--Related Internet Sites(p. 285)
• Glossary(p. 287)
• Index(p. 299)

Reseñas proporcionadas por Syndetics

CHOICE Review

Schick, professor of public policy (George Mason Univ.) and author of The Capacity to Budget (CH, Jan'91) and Congress and Money (CH, Mar'81), unquestionably knows the arcane intricacies required to construct the federal budget. The title's threefold promise is fulfilled on the process portion; readers are rewarded with useful information on the nuts-and-bolts mechanics. Lamentably, the policy portion is sparse and politics is practically nonexistent. Schick's prose demands much from the reader. Like the budget process he describes, key words require careful attention from the reader, but chapter 3 is an excellent budgetary primer. Schick ignores much of the vital lobbying process, especially in the corridors of Capitol Hill. The Gingrich revolution, shift of Congressional power, and passage of the line-item veto has outdated this book in key areas, especially the dynamics of budgeting that confront President Clinton's next two years. Readers can consult William Greider's Who Will Tell the People (1992) for a perceptive analysis of budget politics and partisanship lacking here. Figures and tables are helpful, but many reproductions of documents are egregious. Recommended for upper-division undergraduates. S. L. Harrison University of Miami

Notas de autor provistas por Syndetics

Allen Schick is a visiting fellow in Governmental Studies at the Brookings Institution and a professor of public policy at the University of Maryland