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The S&L debacle public policy lessons for bank and thrift regulation Lawrence J. White.

Por: Detalles de publicación: New York Oxford University Press 1991.Descripción: xiv, 287 p. 25 cmISBN:
  • 0195067339 (alk. paper)
Tema(s): Clasificación CDD:
  • 332.3/2/0973 20
Clasificación LoC:
  • HG2151 .W47 1991
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Descripciones mejoradas de Syndetics:

Many Americans have viewed the SandL crisis as the ultimate example of greed's pervasiveness in our society. Yet the personalities that have dominated the news have obscured the real issues behind the worst debacle in our nation's financial history. Surveying the modern course of the thrift industry, from the Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932 to the current efforts at restructuring, Lawrence J. White addresses the essential questions of the SandL crisis: what happened, how it happened, why it happened, and what must be done so that it never happens again. White, who from November 1986 to August 1989 was a Board Member of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board--the government agency that regulated SandLs and insured their deposits through the FSLIC--combines his knowledge as an insider with the insights of an economist to bring a much-needed fresh perspective on the SandL mess. He shows that, rather than the result of widespread fraud, the crisis was rooted in the highly unusual economic conditions of the early 1980s, poorly thought-out deregulatory policies, and flawed accounting practices. The SandL Debacle reveals that the banking system of the late 1970s was anachronistic. Tightly regulated thrifts were locked into portfolios of long-term mortgages and limited in the interest rates that they could pay to depositors. When interest rates soared, the thrifts experienced heavy losses. Clearly, adjustment in the industry was necessary, and the economic deregulatory policies implemented in the early 1980s were long overdue. But White points out that these policies should have been accompanied by strengthened safety-and-soundness regulations. Instead, safety-and-soundness rules were also deregulated, bringing a deadly combination of opportunities, capabilities, and incentives for risk-taking that spelled disaster for hundreds of thrifts--and ultimately for the FSLIC insurance fund and the U.S. taxpayer. White offers far-reaching recommendations for reform, such as better methods of gathering information about thrifts before they become insolvent, risk-related net worth requirements, risk-based insurance premiums--so that deposit insurance is treated more like other forms of insurance--and stronger powers of early intervention by regulators. With its comprehensive overview, incisive analysis, and clear, nontechnical language, this book is important reading for anyone hoping to understand the SandL crisis and will be an essential guide for economists and policymakers of the future.

Spine title: The S & L debacle.

Includes bibliographical references (p. 265-275) and index.

Tabla de contenidos provista por Syndetics

  • Preface(p. vii)
  • A Brief Glossary(p. xiii)
  • Chapter 1 Introduction(p. 3)
  • Notes(p. 9)
  • Part 1 Background(p. 11)
  • Chapter 2 The Thrift Industry: a Recent Picture(p. 13)
  • Notes(p. 23)
  • Chapter 3 The Regulatory Framework and the Importance of Accounting(p. 25)
  • Notes(p. 46)
  • Part 2 Prelude, Deregulation, and the Debacle(p. 51)
  • Chapter 4 Developments Before 1980(p. 53)
  • Notes(p. 65)
  • Chapter 5 The Interest Rate Squeeze and the Policy Responses, 1979-1982(p. 67)
  • Notes(p. 95)
  • Chapter 6 The Debacle, 1983-1985(p. 99)
  • Notes(p. 119)
  • Part 3 Regulatory Response and Cleanup(p. 123)
  • Chapter 7 Tightening the Regulations and Recapitalizing the Fslic, 1985-1987(p. 125)
  • Notes(p. 142)
  • Chapter 8 Beginning the Cleanup, 1988(p. 147)
  • Notes(p. 170)
  • Chapter 9 The Firrea, 1989(p. 175)
  • Notes(p. 200)
  • Part 4 Reforming Deposit Insurance and Bank and Thrift Regulation(p. 205)
  • Chapter 10 Regulation, Deposit Insurance, and the Lessons and Analogies from Other Types of Insurance(p. 207)
  • Notes(p. 219)
  • Chapter 11 Fundamental Reforms for Bank and Thrift Regulation and for Deposit Insurance(p. 223)
  • Notes(p. 246)
  • Chapter 12 Conclusion(p. 251)
  • Notes(p. 264)
  • Bibliography(p. 265)
  • Index(p. 277)

Reseñas proporcionadas por Syndetics

CHOICE Review

White, a former national regulator of the savings and loan industry and currently a professor of economics at New York University, has written a compact, complete, and dispassionate analysis of the causes and effects of the substantial collapse of the S&L industry in the US. Most important, White succinctly points out the lessons to be learned and applied elsewhere as governments worldwide grapple with the problem of insuring that the financial system--the circulatory system of the body economic, as it were--is capable of carrying out its essential functions. Absent are the anecdotes, the insider views, the whispered gossip. Instead, White uses clear-eyed factual analysis squarely based on proved theory to find out what went wrong and why. The chief culprits are excessive reliance upon the use of historical records rather than realistic evaluations of current market conditions to determine risk, coupled with a perverse mixture of politics and populism that has long constrained the growth and development of the American financial system. Faced with a challenge, the political system was unable and unwilling to react with sufficient speed, insight, and courage. Extensive notes; excellent bibliography; very complete index. A must acquisition for any finance or money and banking collection. Academic and public libraries. -D. E. Bond, University of British Columbia

Booklist Review

White is a New York University professor who also served for three years on the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. From this special perspective, he provides a thorough, rigorous analysis of public policy decisions that resulted in the current savings and loan crisis. Unlike the many anecdotal, narrative accounts of S & L failures, White's thoughtful examination shows how and why the collapse occurred, and he lays out future decisions necessary to enable a recovery and prevent similar events from happening. He also provides an especially effective graphic showing why the current effort to resolve the crisis may fall short: an "organizational chart" delineating functional relationships among the many government agencies involved that for all the world looks like a schematic wiring diagram from a 1962 Philco television set. ~--David Rouse

Notas de autor provistas por Syndetics

About the Author: Lawrence J. White is Arthur E. Imperatore Professor of Economics at New York University's Stern School of Business. He is the author of many books, most recently Interational Trade in Ocean Shipping Services: The U.S. and the World (1988).
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