Descripciones mejoradas de Syndetics:

Bureaucracy and Public Economics brings together in one volume the classic book and related articles which put forward the first formal economic theory of the behaviour of bureaucracies.

William Niskanen Jr. has consistently argued that bureaucrats have personal objectives - that differ from those of both their political supervisors and the general public - which they further by use of their monopoly power. He develops his argument to contend that government budgets have become too large and should be curtailed. All of Professor Niskanen's major contributions to this field have been brought together in this one volume including his pioneering article on 'The Peculiar Economics of Bureaucracy', the full text of the book ' Bureaucracy and Representative Government ' and his recent reassessment of the larger body of scholarship on the economics of bureaucracy.

Scholars, students and teachers of public economics will welcome this volume which, by making some of the key contributions in the field more widely accessible, will provoke discussion, debate and further research.

Reseñas proporcionadas por Syndetics

CHOICE Review

This volume is a reissue of Niskanen's Bureaucracy and Representative Government (originally published in 1971), supplemented with two previously published journal articles on the economics of bureaucracy and on bureaucrats and politicians, along with a brief reassessment of his original work in bureaucratic behavior. Niskanen's theory of bureau behavior employs a rigorously developed model that is unlikely to be accessible to readers not comfortable with the algebra and geometry of maximization problems in microeconomics. He concludes that in representative democracies bureau-industry complexes (an extension of Eisenhower's farewell warning about the military-industrial complex) are likely to arise, resulting in the provision of public goods and services that are more than optimal from the overall perspective of society. Moreover, Niskanen is skeptical that either executive or legislative review is likely to successfully restrain bureau budget maximizing efforts. The current public policy debate over agency terminations makes the reissue of Niskanen's work a useful addition to upper-division undergraduate and graduate collections of libraries not owning Niskanen's previous edition. R. Kelly; Fairfield University

Notas de autor provistas por Syndetics

The late William A. Niskanen, formerly Chairman, The Cato Institute, US