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Theories of Truth provides a critical introduction to one of the most difficult areas of philosophy. It surveys all of the major philosophical theories of truth, presenting the crux of the issues involved at a level accessible to nonexperts yet in a manner sufficiently detailed and original to be of value to professional scholars. Kirkham's systematic treatment and explanations of terminology ensure that readers should come away from this book with a comprehensive general understanding of one of philosophy's thorniest set of topics.

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• Preface
• Projects of Theories of Truth
• 1.1 Four-Dimensional Confusion
• 1.2 How to Resolve This Confusion
• 1.3 Extensionality
• 1.4 Intensionality
• 1.5 Natural Necessity
• 1.6 Philosophical Analysis
• 1.7 The Main Projects and Their Subdivisions
• 1.8 Putting the Clues Together
• 1.9 Projects and Programs
• 1.10 Chapter Summary
• Justification and Truth Bearers
• 2.1 The Epistemological Enterprise
• 2.2 Truth, Justification, and Warranted Assertibility
• 2.3 Confusion about Truth Bearers
• 2.4 A Tolerant Attitude about Truth Bearers
• 2.5 Sentence Tokens
• 2.6 Truth versus Truth-in-L
• 2.7 An Objection to the Concept of a Truth Bearer
• 2.8 Chapter Summary
• Nonrealist Theories
• 3.1 Realist and Nonrealist Theories of Truth
• 3.2 Charles S. Peirce's Pragmaticism
• 3.3 William James's Instrumentalism
• 3.4 Truth and Value
• 3.5 Brand Blanshard's Coherence Theory
• 3.6 Skepticism and Nonrealist Theories
• 3.7 A Regress Problem for All Nonrealist Theories
• 3.8 Local Nonrealism
• 3.9 Chapter Summary
• The Correspondence Theory
• 4.1 Two Kinds of Correspondence
• 4.2 Bertrand Russell's Theory of Correspondence as Congruence
• 4.3 J. L. Austin's Theory of Correspondence as Correlation
• 4.4 Some Technical Problems
• 4.5 The Essence of the Correspondence Theory
• 4.6 Nonrealist Correspondence Theories
• 4.7 Objections to the Correspondence Theory
• 4.8 Chapter Summary
• Alfred Tarski's Semantic Theory
• 5.1 Tarski's Goals
• 5.2 Tarski's Theory
• 5.3 Recursion
• 5.4 Satisfaction
• 5.5 Names and Natural Languages
• 5.6 Programs and Special Adequacy Conditions
• 5.7 The Essence of Tarski's Notion of Truth
• 5.8 Is the Semantic Theory a Correspondence Theory?
• 5.9 Chapter Summary
• Objections to Tarski's Theory
• 6.1 Objections to Tarski's Material Adequacy Condition
• 6.2 The Semantic Theory and the Justification Project
• 6.3 The Relativity Objection
• 6.4 The Vacuity Objection
• 6.5 Is Tarski Ontologically Neutral?
• 6.6 Hartry Field and the Physicalist Program
• 6.7 Neurath, Carnap, and the Origins of Modern Physicalism
• 6.8 Objections to Physicalism
• 6.9 Chapter Summary
• The Justification Project
• 7.1 The Relation of Theories of Justification to Theories of Truth
• 7.2 Foundationalism
• 7.3 Instrumentalism as a Theory of Justification
• 7.4 F. H. Bradley's Coherence Theory of Justification
• 7.5 Chapter Summary
• Davidson and Dummett
• 8.1 Davidson's Program
• 8.2 Complications and Cautions
• 8.3 Some Objections to the Davidson Program
• 8.4 Dummett's Theory of Meaning
• 8.5 Dummett's Argument against Construing Meaning as Truth Conditions
• 8.6 A Critique of Dummett's Argument
• 8.7 Truth-as-Justification and Skepticism Again
• 8.8 Chapter Summary
• The Liar Paradox
• 9.1 Damnable Lies
• 9.2 Russell's Theory of Types
• 9.3 The Object-Language/Metalanguage Distinction
• 9.4 Criticisms of the Language-Levels Approach
• 9.5 Saul Kripke's Theory of Truth-Value Gaps
• 9.6 A. N. Prior's Solution
• 9.7 Truth-Value Gluts
• 9.8 Situational Semantics and the Liar Paradox
• 9.9 Chapter Summary
• The Speech-Act Project and the Deflationary Thesis
• 10.1 Strawson, Price, and the Illocutionary-Act Project
• 10.2 The Assertion Project
• 10.3 The Theory of Truth-as-Appraisal
• 10.4 F. P. Ramsey's Redundancy Theory
• 10.5 C. J. F. Williams's Redundancy Theory
• 10.6 The Prosentential Theory of Truth
• 10.7 The Deflationary Thesis
• 10.8 Paul Horwich's Minimalist Answer to the Metaphysical Project
• 10.9 Chapter Summary
• Notes
• References
• Index

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CHOICE Review

A systematic though introductory critical survey of a variety of major philosophical theories of truth. After an especially useful introductory chapter in which Kirkham clearly lays out importantly distinct projects in the service of which different theories of truth may be offered, he proceeds to discuss how best to understand the contrast between realist and nonrealist theories, between correspondence and coherence theories, Tarski's theory, the views of Davidson and Dummett on truth, Kripke's theory, and deflationary theories. Kirkham is at his best in his careful and sympathetic explanation of difficult terminology and in his ability gradually to provide his readers with the technical wherewithal to understand the basic features and formal motivations for Tarski's semantic theory of truth as well as Kripke's alternative attempt to solve the liar paradox. A background in elementary symbolic logic is not presupposed. A central critical aim of the book is to emphasize that not all theories of truth are intended to answer the same questions and that only when the different questions are distinguished can we fairly evaluate the different theories. Though experts may find some of Kirkham's critical remarks on specific theories superficial or mistaken, his discussion nevertheless does usefully help to introduce beginning students to a range of important issues central to the topic. Strongly recommended to undergraduate and graduate libraries. W. Taschek; Ohio State University