The public use of private interest Charles L. Schultze.
Series Godkin lectures at Harvard University ; 1976.Detalles de publicación: Washington Brookings Institution c1977.Descripción: viii, 93 p. 22 cmISBN:- 0815777620
- 0815777612
- 336.3/9/0973
- HJ7539 .S38
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Descripciones mejoradas de Syndetics:
According t conventional wisdom, government may intervene when private markets fail to provide goods and services that society values. This view has led to the passage of much legislation and the creation of a host of agencies that have attempted, by exquisitely detailed regulations, to compel legislatively defined behavior in a broad range of activities affecting society as a whole--health care, housing, pollution abatement, transportation, to name only a few. Far from achieving the goals of the legislators and regulators, these efforts have been largely ineffective; worse, they have spawned endless litigation and countless administrative proceedings as the individuals and firms on who the regulations fall seek to avoid, or at least soften, their impact. The result has been long delays in determining whether government programs work at all, thwarting of agreed-upon societal aims, and deep skepticism about the power of government to make any difference. Strangely enough in a nation that since its inception has valued both the means and the ends of the private market system, the United States has rarely tried to harness private interests to public goals. Whenever private markets fail to produce some desired good or service (or fail to deter undesirable activity), the remedies proposed have hardly ever involved creating a system of incentives similar to those of the market place so as to make private choice consonant with public virtue. In this revision of the Godkin Lectures presented at Harvard University in November and December 1976, Charles L. Schultze examines the sources of this paradox. He outlines a plan for government intervention that would turn away from the direct "commandand control" regulating techniques of the past and rely instead on market-like incentives to encourage people indirectly to take publicly desired actions.
Rev. and expanded version of the Godkin lectures delivered at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University in Nov. and Dec. 1976.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Notas de autor provistas por Syndetics
Charles Louis Schultze was born in Alexandria, Virginia on December 12, 1924. During World War II, he served for three years in the Army and was awarded a Purple Heart and Bronze Star. He received a bachelor's degree in economics and a master's degree in economics from Georgetown University and a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Maryland.He was on the staff of the Council of Economic Advisers from 1952 to 1959, then left to teach at Indiana University. He was worked as deputy budget director under President John F. Kennedy, budget director under President Lyndon B. Johnson, and chief economic adviser under President Jimmy Carter. He was a research scholar at Brookings Institution in Washington for 45 years. He wrote several books including Memos to the President: A Guide Through Macroeconomics for the Busy Policymaker. He died on September 27, 2016 at the age of 91.
(Bowker Author Biography)